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In view of a shrinking defense budget, there will likely be
an increase in the number of Cost/Schedule Status Report
(C/SSR) managed contracts. Thus, it is imperative that the
DoD non-major system project manager understand how to
integrate performance measurement information and analysis
into responsible management decision making. This thesis will
focus on what the DoD non-major system project manager should
know to accomplish this by providing a comprehensive look at
the Cost /Schedule Status Report, its implementation, and
report analysis. The thesis will also discuss the Navy A-12
Avenger Aircraft Program termination affect on the C/SSR
environment by presenting and analyzing recent initiatives
taken to improve performance management, discussing "lessons
learned, " and providing the researcher' s recommendations for
future initiatives. Finally, this thesis will analyze
proposed C/SSR Joint Guide revisions and provide
recommendations for C/SSR improvement.
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In view of planned cutbacks in future defense authoriza-
tions, and aroused congressional interest in cost and schedule
management following the Navy's A-12 Avenger Aircraft Program
termination, it is imperative that the DoD non-major system
project manager understand how to integrate both performance
measurement information and analysis into responsible manage-
ment decision making. When rigorously implemented and
properly used, the Cost/Schedule Status Report (C/SSR)
provides the program manager with objective, standardized cost
and schedule performance reporting that enables him to track
program progress and initiate corrective actions as required.
The Honorable Donald J. Yockey, Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, reinforces this message by passionately
advocating the use of performance measurement (earned value)
as a management tool. As the Keynote speaker at the 1991
C/SCSC National Workshop in Falls Church, Virginia, he
asserted, "When program managers use this business management
tool (earned value) properly, their programs will be both
better planned and better executed and, therefore, ultimately
much more successful." [Ref l:p. 16]
Although major, or significant programs often overshadow
non-major, or less than significant ones, non-major acquisi-
tions share similar cost and schedule concerns . Given the
declining defense budget, it is very likely that non-major
acquisitions will make up a larger percentage of Department of
Defense programs. Based upon the equipment successes of
Desert Storm, Congress and DoD are motivating the military
services to shift their resources and efforts to system
upgrades vice system replacement. Undoubtedly, heightened
Congressional/DoD interest and oversight will be placed upon
cost and schedule control management of non-major programs.
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The objective of this research is to provide the reader
with an understanding of the critical importance of cost and
schedule management control in non-major DOD acquisitions.
The research provides a comprehensive examination of the
Cost/Schedule Status Report (C/SSR) , including report ratio-
nale, report analysis, and the project manager's use in cost
and schedule management. This thesis also examines changes in
the C/SSR environment as a result of the Navy's A-12 Avenger
Program termination, analyzes "lessons learned" from the
termination, and provides the researcher' s recommendations for
future cost and schedule management improvement initiatives.
In addition, the thesis analyzes the December 1991 proposed
Cost/Schedule Status Report Cost/Schedule Status Report Joint
Guide revision. Contractor complaints of Government inconsis-
tency in C/SSR application, changes in C/SSR application
defined in Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.2,
and changes resulting from a December 19 91 Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) clause detailing minimum provisions of a
contractor cost and schedule management system prompted the
proposed revision. The analysis will focus on how to retain
adequate uniformity in reporting requirements while allowing
the project manager flexibility to tailor requirements based
on contract size and complexity.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is
:
"What should the project manager know to achieve cost and
schedule control in non-major Department of Defense acquisi-
tions and what affect has the Cost/Schedule Status Report had
on cost and schedule performance?"
The following subsidiary questions are:
1. What are the key aspects of the DoD Cost/Schedule
Status Report (C/SSR)
?
2. How does non-major acquisition cost/schedule
management differ from major system acquisition
cost/schedule management? How is it similar?
3. How does the project manager use the data provided
in the Cost/Schedule Status Report?
4
.
How does the Government set an appropriate threshold
to measure cost/schedule variance?
5. Since C/SSR does not require the evaluation or
acceptance of a contractor' s internal management
procedures, what problems does this create?
6.
What is meant by rebaselining and what effect does
it have on C/SSR?
7. How should the C/SSR be changed to retain adequate
uniformity in reporting requirements while allowing
the project manager flexibility to tailor
requirements based on contract size and complexity?
8 How has the Navy' s A-12 program cancellation
affected the C/SSR environment? Are there any
applicable lessons learned?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
1 Scope
This thesis focuses on what a DoD non-major acquisition
project manager needs to know about cost and schedule manage-
ment. It accomplishes this goal by providing a comprehensive
look at the Cost/Schedule Status Report (C/SSR) including
examination of report rationale, report analysis, and report
use in project management. It also focuses on the future
direction of the C\SSR including options to retain uniformity
in the C/SSR Joint Guide, while allowing the project manager





This thesis limits its scope to C/SSR application in
non-major acquisitions. As for application to sub-contracts
in major system acquisitions, prime contractors usually review
sub-contractor C/SSR information and incorporate it within the
major system's Cost Performance Report.
3. Assumptions
This paper assumes that, although a major program is
larger in dollar value and scope, non-major programs share
many similar issues and problems in cost and schedule manage-
ment. Also, to avoid confusion with the manner non-major and
major projects/programs, and significant and less than
significant projects/programs are addressed within DoDD
5000.1, DoDI 5000.2, and The C/SSR Joint Guide, the term non-
major project/program will be used synonymously with the term
less than significant project/program. In addition, the term




The research foundation of this thesis is the current
Cost/Schedule Status Report Joint Guide that provides Depart-
ment of Defense guidelines for cost/schedule management of
non-major acquisitions [Ref. 2]. Government reports, direc-
tives, instructions, textbooks, and periodicals were also used
as information sources. The 1991 proposed Cost/Schedule
Status Report Joint Guide was used for thesis analysis.
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) and
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) searches also
provided the author a broad base of information.
The research base also includes interviews with numerous
Government and industry personnel involved in various aspects
of the Cost/Schedule Status Report. Personal interviews were
conducted with engineers and analysts from Defense Contract
Management Area Operations (DCMAO) in San Bruno and Sunnyvale,
California to gain a perspective of DCMAO' s role in cost and
schedule surveillance. Several Administrative Contracting
Officers (ACO) were also interviewed to gain an understanding
of their role in cost and schedule management.
Personal interviews were also conducted with senior service
and Department of Defense staff personnel during a thesis
trip to Washington, District of Columbia, and Wright Patterson
Air Force Base, Ohio. Those interviewed included Performance
Measurement Joint Executive Group (PMJEG) representatives from
the Army, Navy, Defense Systems Management College, and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) . These
interviews provided a perspective of current policy issues
concerning the Cost/Schedule Status Report. In addition,
interviews with professors at the Defense Systems Management
College, the Air Force Institute of Technology, and a member
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
staff provided insight into cost and schedule training
programs available within the Department of Defense.
Interviews were also conducted with project managers and/or
staff representatives from the Army Communication and Elec-
tronics Command (CECOM) , the Army Missile Command (MICOM) , the
Air Force Laboratory Command, and the Defense Nuclear Agency
to gain an understanding of the use of the C/SSR within the PM
office. In addition, the author obtained information and
insight on the various aspects of cost and schedule management
through attendance at the 1991 C/SCSC National Workshop. This
forum exposed the author to a diverse group of cost and sched-
ule management professionals from the various military
services, industry, Department of Defense Staff, the Perfor-
mance Management Association, the National Security Industrial
Association, and the Society of Cost Estimating and Analysis.
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Pertinent definitions are included in Appendix A. Abbrevi-
ations are included in Appendix B.
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter I is a
general introduction presenting research questions, objec-
tives, and methodology. Chapter I also includes a thesis
chapter outline. Chapter II discusses the history and
background of the Cost /Schedule Status Report, highlights key
aspects of the report, and describes key differences between
the Cost/Schedule Status Report and the Cost Performance
Report used for major programs. Chapter III discusses
Cost/Schedule Status Report implementation. Chapter IV
examines report analysis and how the project manager uses
report information and trend analysis to support management
decisions. Chapter V analyzes how the Navy's A-12 Avenger
program termination has impacted the C/SSR environment. This
chapter also provides cost and schedule management "lessons
learned" from the A-12 and researcher recommendations for
future improvement initiatives . Chapter VI explores current
controversy in the proposed Cost/Schedule Status Report Joint
Guide revision and provides the researcher' s recommendations
for C/SSR improvement. Chapter VII presents a thesis summary,
conclusions, answers, and findings to thesis questions,
researcher recommendations, and suggested areas for future
research
.
II. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE COST/SCHEDULE STATUS REPORT
A. HISTORY/BACKGROUND
Cost and schedule management of non-major programs has been
an evolving process within the Department of Defense for over
thirty years. It originated in the late 1950' s with the
development of the Program Evaluation and Review Technique
(PERT) . The increased complexity of weapons systems prompted
the need for a management tool to track project progress.
The Navy, therefore, developed PERT as a scheduling technique
to manage their Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missile System. PERT
provided the capability to display graphically the interrela-
tionships of specific program activities. This enabled the
project manager to focus on the planning and progress of
upcoming critical activities in the schedule. A subsequent
upgrade to PERT called PERT Cost added the capability to
budget and report costs by PERT network activities. [Ref.
3:pp. 13-14]
Unfortunately, PERT and PERT Cost reporting requirements
were often negotiated into contracts on top of valid, existing
contractor management and control systems. This led to
redundant contractor effort, and increased overhead expenses.
Also, since the reports were not derived from the contractor's
actual management control system, they did not accurately
reflect current project status. [Ref. 3:p. 14]
In 1963, the Air Force Minuteman Missile Program Office,
together with the Performance Technology Corporation, devel-
oped the earned value concept . Earned value provided the
capability to measure the work actually accomplished in terms
of the budget planned for that work. This system specified
the general capabilities required of a contractor's internal
management system, instead of requiring a specific, detailed
Government system. To ensure these capabilities were met, the
Government conducted on-site reviews and validations of a
contractor's internal management system. [Ref. 3:p. 14]
During the early 1960's, a group within the Office of the
Secretary of the Air Force was also working on a set of
simplified standards to measure a contractor' s internal
management system. This approach contained the essential
elements of the PERT Cost and earned value systems, but
avoided detailed PERT cost reporting. In 1966, these
standards emerged into the "Cost/Schedule and Control Specifi-
cation" and became the cornerstone of Air Force project
management. [Ref. 3:p. 14]
In December 1967, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) published DoD Instruction 7000.2, Performance
Measurement for Selected Acquisitions
.
This instruction
incorporated the basic tenets of the Air Force "Cost/Schedule
and Control Specification." It included 35 Cost/Schedule
Systems Criteria (C/SCSC) to be imposed on contractor internal
management systems to ensure reliable, integrated cost and
10
schedule management. It also established a standard require-
ment for cost and schedule performance measurement throughout
the Department of Defense. In August 1970, the C/SCSC Joint
Implementation Guide was published to provide further, more
detailed guidance on earned value and how it should be
implemented within DoD
.
Unfortunately, the Cost/Schedule Systems Criteria and
C/SCSC Joint Implementation Guide were not well suited for
smaller, non-major (less significant) projects. PMs of non-
major programs were expected to implement the C/SCSC system
less rigorously [Ref . 2: p. 1-1] . The program manager was
expected to use his experience and assessment of the contrac-
tor risk, scope of work, and other factors to evaluate the
level of implementation. This vague guidance resulted in
inconsistent application of the criteria. "Furthermore, the
lack of standard formats for contractor cost/schedule report-
ing on non-major contracts led to a proliferation of contract-
unique reports, to the use of out-dated reports and to the
application of cost/schedule control system and reporting
requirements, which had been designed for large contracts, to
smaller and smaller contracts [Ref. 2:p. 1-1]." As a result,
DOD Instruction 7000.10, Contractor Cost Performance, Funds
Status and Cost/Schedule Status Reports, was published in
August 1974. Department of Defense Instruction 7000.10
established the Cost/Schedule Status Report (C/SSR) as the
standard for reporting summarized cost/schedule performance on
11
non-major acquisitions. Also, in 1978, the C/SSR Joint Guide
was published to provide more detailed, uniform guidance on
the Cost /Schedule Status Report and the management of non-
major contracts. According to the 1978, C/SSR Joint Guide, a
non-major contract was considered a development contract under
$25 million dollars or a production contract under $100
million dollars [Ref. 2: p. 1—1]. These dollar values
associated with application of the C/SSR were adjusted in
1987, as specified in DoD Directive 5000.1, Major and Non-
Major Defense Acquisition Programs . According to DoDD 5000.1,
a non-major contract was considered one in which DoD
Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria was not required;
usually development contracts under $40 million dollars or
production contracts under $160 million dollars [Ref. 4:p. 1] .
In 1988, Mr. Costello, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition (USD (A) ) , initiated a review of acquisition policy
and procedures. Subsequently, a Defense Management Review
Team formed to identify recommendations for streamlining and
disciplining the acquisition system. Mr. Betti, Mr.
Costello' s successor as USD (A) continued this effort by
initiating a task force. [Ref. 5] These efforts resulted in
the February 1991 publication of Department of Defense
Instruction (DoDI) 5000.2, Defense Acquisition Management
Policies and Procedures, replacing DoDI Instruction 7000.2.
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2 is currently imple-
mented throughout DoD. This document redefined the guidance
12
on the application of the C/SSR. According to DoDI 5000.2,
the Cost/Schedule Status Report will now be used on contracts
that are not significant enough for cost/schedule systems
criteria application [Ref. 6: p. ll-B-3, para. 2d]. A non-
significant or less than significant contract is a research,
development, test and evaluation contract with a value of less
than $60 million, or a procurement contract with a value of
less than $250 million (in fiscal year 1990 constant dollars)
[Ref. 6: p. ll-B-2, para 2b. (2)].
Exceptions to cost/schedule status reporting authorized by
DoDI 5000.2 include contracts that are firm fixed price
(including firm fixed price contracts with economic price
adjustment provisions) , time and materials contracts, and
contracts that consist mostly of level of effort work [Ref.
6:p. ll-B-2, para. 2c] . Department of Defense Manual 5000. 2M,
Defense Acquisition Management Documentation and Reports,
further specifies the use of the C/SSR as "...to obtain
contract cost and schedule performance information on con-
tracts over 12 months in duration where application of the
Cost Performance Report is not appropriate." [Ref. 7: p. 2 0-8,
para, c] Although the manual does not establish a specific
dollar minimum, it suggests that application of the C/SSR to
contracts less than $5 million (constant fiscal year 1990
dollars) should be carefully evaluated to ensure that only the
minimum information necessary for effective management control
is required.
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The 7 January 1991 cancellation of the Navy's A-12 Avenger
aircraft by the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Cheney, due to
severe cost and schedule problems, has reinforced the require-
ment for effective cost and schedule management within the
Department of Defense. This emphasis is strengthened by the
current USD (A) , Mr. Don Yockey, who advocates the use of
earned value procedures as an essential part of any PM early
warning system [Ref . 1] . These factors, combined with a
shrinking defense budget, will ensure that cost and schedule
performance management remain a crucial aspect of DoD project
management
.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE COST/SCHEDULE STATUS REPORT
The C/SSR provides the Government project manager with
summary level cost/schedule performance status information,
normally monthly, for early identification of the magnitude
and impact of problems having significant cost variances;
effects of management actions taken to resolve existing
problems; and contract status information for use in decision-
making [Ref. 8: p. 3-2] . It identifies those work breakdown
structure elements responsible for cost and schedule problems
and provides trend information to estimate final project
costs. It is a less extensive, more flexible, management
report, more appropriate for less than significant acquisi-
tions. The C/SSR gives contractors flexibility in their
internal management operations by avoiding the imposition of
14
specific systems or changes to their existing systems. In
addition, the basic objectives of the C/SSR are to:
1
.
Provide for effective management of non-major (or less
than significant) contracts, especially those that
are critical or high risk.
2. Provide for objective, integrated cost/schedule
performance reporting on these contracts.
3. Standardize cost and schedule performance reporting
on these contracts.
4 Provide compatible cost and schedule performance data
with that generated on significant contracts.
[Ref. 2:p. 1-2]
C. KEY ASPECTS OF THE COST/SCHEDULE STATUS REPORT
The Cost/Schedule Status Report consists of four parts:
contract report administrative information, contract data,
performance data, and narrative explanations. The short
administrative section includes information on the contract
type, project name, contractor name and location, report
period, and signature of the contractor' s authorized represen-
tative who prepared the report itself.
The contract data section establishes the overall contract
value. This value serves as a cost baseline for the purposes
of cost performance measurement. Items included in this
section are:
1 The Original Contract Target Cost- The dollar value





Negotiated Contract Changes- The cumulative cost
(excluding fee or profit) applicable to definitive
contract changes that have occurred since the




Current Target Cost- This figure is the sum of the
original contract target cost and the negotiated
contract changes
.
4 Estimated Cost of Authorized, Unpriced Work- Estimated
cost (excluding fee or profit) for contract changes
that have written authorization, but are still
unpriced.
5. Contract Budget Base- This figure is the sum of the
current target cost and the estimate of authorized,
unpriced work. [Ref. 2: pp. E2-E3]
The performance data section on the C/SSR depicts contract
cost status for the specified cost work breakdown structure
elements on a cumulative basis and as estimated at completion.
[Ref. 2: p. 4-1] . Cost, schedule, and estimate at completion
variances in exceeding previously established thresholds need
to be fully explained in the contractor's narrative comments.
Items included in this section are:
1 Work Breakdown Structure Element- This column contains
the various contract work breakdown structure (WBS)
elements for the contract. The level of work
breakdown reporting is usually specified in the




Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled- This is the value of
all work scheduled to be accomplished as of the
reporting cut-off date listed by each WBS element
.
3 Budgeted Cost of Work Performed- This is the value of
all work accomplished as of the reporting cut-off date




Actual Cost of Work Performed- This is the cumulative
actual costs (direct and indirect) of work
accomplished as of the reporting cut-off date listed
by each WBS element
.
5 Schedule Variance- This is the difference between the
Budgeted Cost for Work Scheduled and the Budgeted Cost
for Work Performed. A negative figure indicates an
unfavorable variance and is shown in parentheses
.
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6. Cost Variance- This is the difference between the
Budgeted Cost of Work Performed and the Actual Cost of





At Completion-Budgeted- This is the total budget
identified to each WBS element (including any contract
changes, application of management reserve, or
internal replanning)
8 Latest Revised Estimate- This is the contractor'
s
latest revised estimate of cost at completion
including estimated overruns or underruns for all
authorized work. This figure consists of the total
dollar value of work to date plus the estimate of cost
for work remaining listed by WBS element
.
9. At Completion-Variance- This is the difference between
the Budgeted Cost at Completion and the Latest Revised
Estimate
.
10. General and Administrative (G&A) - These figures
represent the total G&A costs applicable to items (2)
through (9)
.
11. Undistributed Budget- These figures represent the
amount of budget applicable to authorized contract
effort that is not identified to WBS elements at or
below the reporting level . It is listed separately
under the columns At Completion-Budgeted and Latest
Revised Estimate.
12 Management Reserve- This figure is the amount of
budget identified as management reserve as of the end
of the reporting period. It is listed under the
column At Completion-Budgeted as the amount of
management reserve expected to be consumed before the
end of the contract . The variance of planned
management reserve versus forecasted management
reserve is listed under the column At Completion-
Variance .
13. Totals- Totals of all cumulative to date and at
completion information are shown at the bottom of the
report. [Ref. 2: pp. E3-E4]
Narrative explanations are included as a separate portion
of the Cost /Schedule Status Report when work breakdown
structure variances exceed established thresholds. All
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contractor explanations provided should be complete and
include details concerning the nature of the problem, variance
impact, and any corrective actions taken. The Government
project manager should carefully review these explanations and
track corrective actions. Often the Government project
manager accomplishes this follow-up with the contractor
project manager through routine telephone communications
and/or meetings.
D. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE COST/SCHEDULE STATUS REPORT AND THE
COST PERFORMANCE REPORT
Although the Cost/Schedule Status Report and Cost Perfor-
mance Report (CPR) (specified for significant acquisitions)
both provide important cost and schedule visibility needed for
effective project management, there are some fundamental
differences in the two reports. First, the C/SSR report
consists of only two formats, or sections, as compared to the
five formats included in the CPR. The C/SSR has a format
similar to format one of the CPR but contains only cumulative
data (from contract award to present) , vice current period
data required by the CPR. The C/SSR also does not require
functional performance reporting, manloading projections, and
baseline reporting, associated with formats two, three, and
four of the CPR. Both reports, however, share a similar
format five, which contains a contractor narrative of overall
contract performance, explanations for significant variances,
18
and identification of problems and recommended corrective
actions
.
The C/SSR and CPR also contain important differences in the
manner in which the budgeted cost of work scheduled (BCWS) and
budgeted cost of work performed (BCWP) are derived. These are
both key factors used in the calculation of schedule and cost
variances for the project. The CPR requires BCWS and BCWP to
be calculated as a direct summation of work package budgets
.
The C/SSR permits the determination of these values through
any reasonably accurate, consistent, and mutually agreed to
means . This provides the contractor maximum use of existing
internal management control systems, and greater flexibility
in the selection of an internal performance measurement
technique
.
Finally, the C/SSR does not require a formal Government
validation of a contractor's internal cost and schedule
management system. Instead, it requires only a contractor
plant visit by selected representatives from the Government
project management (PM) and contract administration offices.
Both the plant visit and the validation, however, have similar
goals of ensuring that the contractor uses consistent and
objective measures for collecting and reporting cost and
schedule information.
These differences between the Cost Performance Report and
Cost/Schedule Status Report allow the C/SSR to be a flexible,
less demanding requirement, and therefore, a less costly
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contract data requirements list (CDRL) item. It is just as
important, however, for the non-major system project manager
to understand the fundamentals of cost and schedule manage-
ment, to effectively utilize C/SSR information for decision
making
.
E. KEY PLAYERS IN COST AND SCHEDULE MANAGEMENT OF NON-MAJOR
PROGRAMS
There are several key players who support the PM in project
cost and schedule management . These players include the
project or matrix assigned cost analyst, the Defense Contract
Audit Agency (DCAA) auditor, Defense Contract Management Area
Operations (DCMAO) personnel, and the Administrative Contract-
ing Officer (ACO) . Collectively, these players provide the PM
with an array of administrative services, contractor data
analysis, contractor surveillance, and contractor performance
evaluation
.
The matrix assigned cost analyst reviews and analyzes the
C/SSR information. He also provides the project manager with
a cost and schedule trend projection, including a forecast for
the total cost of the project at completion. Depending on the
size of the project, the business/financial cost analyst may
be organic to the PM office. Usually, however, this analyst
is part of a matrix support organization within a major
systems command.
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The Defense Contract Audit Agency auditor provides the PM
with periodic evaluations of the contractor' s C/SSR data and
his accounting records . The auditor also provides an indepen-
dent analysis of the contractor' s performance to the Adminis-
trative Contracting Officer (ACO) , upon his request. Included
in his analysis is an Estimate at Completion (EAC) . The EAC
is the sum of all actual direct and allowable indirect
contract costs, plus an estimate of cost for authorized work
remaining.
The Defense Contract Management Area Operations (DCMAO)
organization provides contract administrative services for the
non-major system project manager. Unlike major systems,
which are usually assigned a dedicated Defense Plant Represen-
tative Office (DPRO) , non-major projects receive support from
the DCMAO office located closest to the contractor. This
operation contains two divisions whose responsibilities
include cost and schedule control management . These two
divisions are the Program and Technical Support Division and
the Contract Management Division.
The Program and Technical Support Division consists of
three branches; the Systems Engineering Branch, the Manufac-
turing Branch, and the Program Support Branch. The Systems
Engineering Branch and the Manufacturing Branch assess
contractor cost, schedule, and technical performance compli-
ance according to the contract. Another key function per-
formed is the review and evaluation of contractor engineering
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change proposals with regard to cost, schedule, and technical
performance impact. [Ref. 9: Chptr 6, Part V, pp. V-6-2
through V-6-6]
The Program Support Branch performs an independent analysis
and assessment of the C/SSR information, coordinates on site
reviews of the contractor, and conducts contractor surveil-
lance [Ref. 9: Chptr 6, Part V, p. V-6-3] . This independent
analysis is provided to the Administrative Contracting Officer
for use in his evaluation of progress payments . The Program
Support Branch can also provide their independent analysis and
assessment to the project manager. This independent analysis
and assessment provides the PM with another perspective of
project performance.
The Contracts Management Division provides contract
administration, contract evaluation, contract negotiation or
discussion, and cost, price and financial analysis [Ref. 9:
Chptr. 6, p. VI-3-3] . The Administrative Contracting Officer
is assigned to this division and reviews, approves or disap-
proves contractor requests for progress payments. If neces-
sary, he can suspend progress payments, given unsatisfactory
contractor work progress. In addition, he monitors the
contractor' s accounting system and performance throughout the
life of the contract.
On a final note, because the DCMAO is often located close
to the contractor plant, it is an excellent position to give
the PM timely visibility of contractor contract performance.
22
The DCMAO can investigate cost and schedule problems first
hand. This is particularly useful to a non-major program




This chapter provided the reader with the history of cost
and schedule management , and an understanding of the origin of
the C/SSR. It also detailed the objectives of the C/SSR,
defined its application, and introduced key aspects of the
report. Differences between the C/SSR and the CPR were
discussed to further inform the reader. Finally, the chapter
outlined the responsibilities of various Department of Defense
agencies and personnel in cost and schedule management, and
described the support they provide to the project manager.
Chapter III will build upon the information provided in
Chapter II. It will discuss C/SSR implementation and its
importance to cost and schedule management. The chapter will
also detail actions the PM should take or monitor to ensure
good initial project management. Finally, Chapter III will
discuss baseline establishment and maintenance, and its




This chapter will provide the reader with an understanding
of the important role the implementation process plays in cost
and schedule management. It will describe management actions
that should be taken during the non-major contract preaward
process to ensure adequate initial cost and schedule manage-
ment and valid C/SSR information. These actions include
careful solicitation preparation and the establishment of
appropriate thresholds by the project manager to measure cost
and schedule variances . The chapter will also discuss the
establishment and maintenance of the performance measurement
baseline. Finally, the chapter will discuss contractor plant
visits, and the role the DCMAO plays in cost and schedule
surveillance monitoring.
B. C/SSR IMPLEMENTATION: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PREAWARD
PROCESS
Management involvement and careful PM attention during the
preaward process cannot be overemphasized. This phase of
C/SSR implementation is key to project cost and schedule
management. Decisions made during preaward impact the manner,
frequency, and level of cost and schedule data reporting
during contract execution.
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The need for management attention during preaward was
reinforced by the findings of the May 1991 Joint DoD/Industry
Total Quality Management (TQM) Team. This team performed a
comprehensive review of the cost/schedule management process
within DoD and industry. The team identified the preaward
prcess as "the most important area in need of process improve-
ment" [Ref. 10:p. 3.3-1]. Among the recommendations made by
the TQM team were, "Participants in the preaward acquisition
process should increase their efforts to ensure adequate and
reasonable cost/schedule reporting requirements" [Ref. 10: p.
3.3-12]. Thus, it is critical for the non-major acquisition
project manager to understand how preaward management activi-
ties and decisions impact project cost and schedule reporting.
C. C/SSR IMPLEMENTATION: PREAWARD
The preaward process begins with the preparation and
issuance of the Government's request for proposal (RFP) to
prospective contractors. Included in the RFP is the statement
of work (SOW) which details Government requirements. It is
important for the SOW to clearly define the Government's needs
to avoid confusion in work requirements. The SOW must
accurately reflect the actual Government requirement, stating
adequately "what" is to be done without describing how [Ref.
20: P. 16]
.
It is important for a SOW to be carefully prepared by the
Government in clear and concise language. While a good SOW
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will not save bad management, a poor SOW will create problems
during project execution [Ref . 20: p. 22] . A poorly written
statement of work can also result in excessive project costs
through subsequent contract changes
.
The requirement for contractor submission of the
Cost/Schedule Status Report is specified by the Government in
the contract request for proposal. The C/SSR is specified as
Data Item Description DI-F-6010 in the Contract Data Require-
ments List (CDRL) of the RFP . In addition, the Defense
Federal Acquistion Regulation Supplement (DFARS) prescribes
the use of DFARS clause 252.242-7005 in the solicitation.
This DFARS clause outlines specific contractor responsibil-
ities to be used in the execution of cost and schedule
management . It requires a prospective contractor to either
submit a written summary of the management procedures it will
establish, maintain, and use in planning and controlling
costs, measuring performance, and generating timely and
reliable C/SSR information, or to submit a Memorandum of
Understanding indicating previous C/SCSC validation. The
clause also describes minimum requirements for a contractor'
s
cost and schedule management system and outlines subcontractor
reporting. It provides for Government Contracting Officer
access to all pertinent contractor records, procedures, and
cost and schedule data. Finally, it specifies the requirement
for the Contracting Officer or designated representative to
visit the contractor's plant to verify cost and schedule
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management procedures, and requires the contractor to submit
substantive changes to his management procedures to the
Contracting Officer for review. [Ref. 21 pp. 252.242-7,
252.242-8]
.
The Government also specifies C/SSR reporting frequency in
the RFP . Generally, a monthly reporting frequency is estab-
lished initially by the Government project manager. Provi-
sions are often included to relax report frequency if the
project progresses well, and the PM determines this can be
accomplished without detrimental management risk.
Also included in the solicitation is a preliminary summary
level (levels one, two, and three) project work breakdown
structure (WBS) organized by product structure (as opposed to
functional organization) . The WBS is a family tree division
of hardware, software, services and project tasks which
organizes, defines, and graphically displays the product to be
produced (as specified in the SOW) , as well as the work to be
accomplished to achieve the specified product. This prelimi-
nary work breakdown structure is prepared by the project
office using guidance outlined in MIL-STD 881, Work Breakdown
Structure for Defense Material Items . It should be represen-
tative of the statement of work.
The project manager should also specify the level of the
work breakdown required for cost and schedule reporting. In
order to keep reporting requirements reasonable, while
maintaining adequate management detail, C/SSR requirements
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should generally be limited to level three or higher (summary
level) of the contract work breakdown structure. This will
provide for performance reporting for about 20 to 30 elements.
Sometimes, however, based on the project manager's risk
assessment, certain high risk elements may be identified for
more detailed, lower level reporting.
Below level three, the contractor should have full flexi-
bility on how the work breakdown structure is organized, as
long as it still reflects product orientation and establishes
clear accountability and responsibility for each piece of work
[Ref . 11] . Contractors will structure their lower WBS levels
to reflect their management needs for planning and control
.
The lowest level of the extended contract WBS, therefore, will
reflect a level of detail appropriate for the contractor'
s
management and cost accounting system.
D. C/SSR IMPLEMENTATION: THRESHOLD ESTABLISHMENT
Variance thresholds should also be set forth in the
Government's request for proposal. Variance thresholds
establish control limits for cost or schedule variances. The
contractor submits narrative explanations in the C/SSR for all
variances exceeding thresholds . Cost variances are listed for
each work breakdown structure element in column five of the
C/SSR. Schedule variances are listed for each WBS element in
column six of the C/SSR.
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Thresholds are established by the project manager. It is
important for the project manager to carefully assess his
threshold requirement to maintain adequate problem visibility.
Variance thresholds set too low (one to five percent of
costs) , could result in voluminous narrative reporting,
innundating the PM with minor problems. However, variance
thresholds set too high (costs greater than 20 percent) could
result in a lack of early management visibility of significant
problems . There are several approaches that can be used by
the project manager to determine appropriate variance thresh-
olds. In many contracts, thresholds are established requiring
a variance analysis for any cost or schedule variance that
exceeds a certain percentage of BCWS or BCWP and/or exceeds an
established dollar minimum. The project manager should
consider aspects such as contract risks and contract size when
choosing a threshold percentage and dollar minimum.
A simple approach sometimes used in variance threshold
establishment is for the PM to establish a fixed number of
variances for the contractor to report [Ref. 12]. For
example, the PM could require the contractor to report the ten
greatest (by dollar value or by percentage) cost or schedule
variances. This approach ensures that the project manager is
receiving a manageable amount of contractor narrative explana-
tions, while ensuring visibility over the most important
project problems. The Air Force's Space Systems Division has
applied this approach with reasonable success [Ref. 11] . The
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National Security Agency also frequently uses this method in
threshold establishment [Ref . 23]
.
Another approach is for the PM to specify narrative
reporting for only high cost and/or schedule critical items
which exceed thresholds [Ref. 2: p. 3-2] . Risk analysis could
be used to determine these critical cost or schedule drivers.
This approach requires good communication between the Govern-
ment PM and the contractor to ensure appropriate items are
reported. One variation to this approach is to set lower
thresholds on critical items and higher thresholds for less
critical items. This allows critical items to be monitored
closely, while allowing management visibility on all signifi-
cant variances
.
Regardless of approach, the PM should include in his
request for proposal a requirement for periodic variance
threshold reviews. A reasonable time frame for the review is
every six months [Ref. 13] . This review requirement provides
the PM the flexibility to adjust thresholds, if necessary,
based on management information needs [Ref. 12] . It also
allows the PM to tighten thresholds, if required, as the
project progresses. As recommended by one experienced
civilian project manager, "As you start a project, thresholds
can be more broad since you have more time to correct prob-
lems, however, narrow thresholds should be established toward
the end of a project" [Ref. 14].
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E. C/SSR IMPLEMENTATION: PREAWARD CONTRACTOR ACTIONS
Upon receipt of a Government request for proposal, a
prospective contractor will review the statement of work. The
contractor uses the SOW as a basis for preliminary cost and
schedule planning. The contractor identifies and allocates
resources based on his assessment of the scope of specified
work. Preliminary schedules are developed and resources are
time phased with the appropriate labor, material, overhead,
and general and administrative (G&A) costs [Ref. 17, p. 1].
Cost estimates developed during this process form the basis of
the contractor's bid or price.
The contractor' s proposal must also explain internal cost
and schedule management practices used by the firm, as
required by DFARS clause number 252.242-7005. This explana-
tion will include a description of how cost and schedule
management will be accomplished and C/SSR data requirements
met. This will facilitate Government evaluation of how the
contractor's internal cost/schedule planning and control
activities generate report data [Ref. 15: p. 2-3]. In
addition, the contractor should also include any recommended
changes and additions to the summary work breakdown structure.
F. C/SSR IMPLEMENTATION: NEGOTIATIONS/DISCUSSIONS, PROPOSAL
EVALUATION
During contract negotiations or discussions between the
Government and a prospective contractor, a target price and
31
target cost are established. In a cost plus fixed fee
contract, an agreed upon estimated contract cost and price is
established. A contract target price or estimated contract
price is the total cost of contract work including profit or
fee, while a contract target cost or estimated cost excludes
profit or fee [Ref.6: p. ll-B-2-2]. The contract target cost,
or estimated cost, will become the base figure the contractor
will use to develop the contract's performance measurement
baseline. The performance measurement baseline is the time
phased budget plan against which project performance is
measured.
During negotiations or discussions, the contract work
breakdown structure is also finalized. Details of cost and
schedule reporting are also negotiated or discussed, including
initial and subsequent report submission dates. It is
important for the PM to ensure that a prospective contractor
fully understands cost/schedule status report requirements to
reduce the potential for reporting problems during contract
execution
.
During proposal evaluation, Government source selection
board representatives must consider the technical, schedule,
operational readiness and support, and financial risks
inherent in a proposal [Ref. 6:p. 10-B-9] . The evaluators
must make an assessment of the contractor's proposed price and
schedule. They evaluate the realism of the contractor's
proposal, relative to Government cost estimates [Ref. 6:p. 10-
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B-9] . A proposal which is assessed as underbid, or unrealis-
tic, has the potential for increased cost and schedule
problems during contract execution. This situation, typically
referred to as a contractor "buy-in, " should be avoided.
A "buy in" may also result in contract front-loading.
Front-loading is an attempt by a contractor to provide
adequate budget in the near-term budget baseline, at the
expense of far-term effort . A contractor who intentially
front-loads his budget, delays visibility of a potential
contract overrun. The contractor hopes that contract changes
will be sufficient to avoid an eventual contract overrun [Ref
.
16 :p. 209] . A related condition which can occur, particularly
with "buy-ins" is "rubber baselining." Rubber baselining is
when a contractor shifts allocated down-stream budget forward
into the current period to cover current cost problems
Similar to front-loading, rubber baselining delays visibility
of a likely contract overrun.
G. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT BASELINE
Upon contract award, the contractor will establish a
management reserve. The management reserve is the portion of
the contract budget base that is held for management control
purposes by the contractor to cover contingencies, or unantic-
ipated program requirements. It is not a part of the perfor-
mance measurement baseline [Ref 16:p. 94]. The amount of
management reserve allocated is based on the contract project
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manager's perceived contract risk, prior experience, and
project length. Generally, the higher the technical risk, the
higher percent of cost is allocated to management reserve.
Also, since smaller projects typically have shorter time spans
and less time to react to problems, a higher management
reserve is often allocated [Ref. 14]. Typically, the manage-
ment reserve will range between eight and 12 percent of the
target cost [Ref. 16:p. 3].
After determination of a management reserve, the contractor
will develop the project schedule. The schedule is tailored
to support contract requirements and should reflect the WBS
structure [Ref. 22:p. 11]. The contractor schedules tasks
down to the cost account level, within the framework of
project milestones [Ref. 16:p. 95]. The cost account level is
the point where the functional responsibility for the work is
assigned. It represents the work assigned to one responsible
organizational element, on one contract work breakdown
structure element [ll-B-2-2]
.
Once a contractor has established the project schedule, he
allocates his budget (minus management reserve) down to the
cost account levels, consistent with the work specified for
each cost account task [Ref 16, p. 95]. Cost accounts are
further subdivided into work packages for more detailed budget
control. Work packages are detailed short span jobs, or
material items which have assigned budgets for accomplishing
the work required to complete the contract [Ref. 19: p. 3],
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Work package costs are summarized at the cost account level
for performance reporting by the cost account manager.
This time-phased budget plan forms the performance measure-
ment baseline against which project performance is measured.
Actuals for each cost account are compared to budgeted values
to assess project cost and schedule performance. These actual
and budgeted values are summarized to the level specified in
the contract for inclusion in the Cost/Schedule Status Report.
Performance measurement baseline establishment is essential
to cost and schedule management . As emphasised by a Defense
Systems Management College (DSMC) Cost and Schedule Management
Professor, "If you start out with an unreasonable baseline,
you start off wrong right off the bat" [Ref 11] . Baseline
establishment forces the contractor to carefully plan the
entire scope of work [Ref. 18: p. 1] . Thus, a contractor
should have a realistic budget and a good performance measure-
ment baseline established as soon as possible after contract
award.
While it may not be possible to plan the entire work effort
in detail at the outset of the contract, budgets must be set
aside for the accomplishment of the future activity. A
contractor should have a detailed baseline developed for all
near term work down to the cost account level and the remain-
ing work planned at a summary level . Six months is often used
as a general definition of near term work, although a shorter
span of time is sometimes used for technically complex
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contracts. As stated by an experienced civilian project
manager, "Good initial planning pays dividends later on in a
project" [Ref . 14]
.
Failure to have a detailed performance measurement baseline
established for near term work causes the project manager to
lose early, accurate performance visibility. This early
performance visibility is particularly important with smaller
and often shorter contracts associated with Cost/Schedule
Status Reporting, as several months of poor performance
visibility could easily represent up to 25 percent of contract
work completion for a one year contract. Yet, according to an
OSD Program Analyst, it is a problem getting the contractor
on-line with an early, solid performance baseline and initial,
valid cost and schedule management reporting [Ref. 6]
.
Thus, it is important for the Government PM to insist that
the contractor establish a detailed baseline soon after
contract award. There are several means to this end. First,
the Government could link the establishment of a performance
baseline to a contract performance review [ref 11] . This
approach ensures that PM attention is focused on baseline
establishment, and forces the contractor to formally brief the
Government PM on his baseline. Another approach is to tie
progress payments to performance baseline establishment. This
approach provides an incentive for the contractor to establish
his performance measurement baseline in a timely manner.
36
Once the performance measurement baseline is established,
it is equally important to maintain its integrity. This
requires particular discipline on the part of the contractor,
as contract changes, funding changes, technical problems, or
other unforeseen difficulties will typically require rebaseli-
ning and/or changing the contract target cost or estimated
cost. Without tight discipline of changes, any established
baseline will be lost [Ref 16] . Any changes made to the
baseline should be traceable to the contract change and
incorporated in a timely manner. The contractor's scheduling
and budgeting systems must be formal and disciplined, to
prevent inadvertent or arbitrary budget or schedule changes
.
As stated by a senior DoD cost analyst, "This does not mean
that the baseline is static or inflexible, simply that changes
must be controlled and result only from deliberate management
actions [Ref. 18]". Many contractors, including Motorola, use
internal project logs to formally record changes
.
A contractor is, however, allowed to internally replan work,
as long as he stays within the total contract target cost or
estimated cost, and completes all work by the contractual
completion date [P.ef . 16: p. 104] . A contractor, however, may
not make retroactive changes to budgets or costs of completed
work [Ref. 22: p. 37]. If work is later found to be sub-
quality, the contractor must plan a new work package to
correct work, as opposed to re-opening the old work package.
Replanning that results in changes to budgets for reporting
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level CWBS elements should be explained by the contractor in
the C/SSR narrative [Ref. 15: p. 4-10].
H. CONTRACTOR PLANT VISIT
Project office, DCMAO, and DCAA representatives become
familiar with the contractor's internal cost management system
through a contractor plant visit . This visit is arranged
through prior coordination with the contractor. The visit
duration varies depending on the size of the contract and
prior contractor experience with the C/SSR. Generally, plant
visits last anywhere from a day to a week.
During the plant visit, Government representatives should
achieve a basic understanding of the methods by which the
contractor plans the work, controls project resources,
evaluates project accomplishment, measures cost/schedule
performance, collects costs, and incorporates contract changes
into the baseline [Ref. 2:p. 2-7] . They should also review
the contractor's performance measurement baseline, to ensure
a valid PMB is in place. An understanding and assessment of
these various aspects is gained through interviews with the
contractor's project manager, contractor cost account manag-
ers, business financial managers, and other contractor plant
personnel. Internal written contracting operating procedures
are also reviewed.
Overall, a sense that cost and schedule management is an
integral part of the contractor's project management, as
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opposed to merely a Government reporting requirement, should
be obtained. A contractor's management system should be
capable of generating timely and reliable information for the
C/SSR. It is, therefore recommended that the Government
project manager personally participate in the plant visit to
emphasize his interest in cost and schedule management.
I . CONTRACTOR MEASUREMENT OF EARNED VALUE
During the plant visit, it is also important for the
Government representatives to gain an understanding of the
contractor's methodology for measuring earned value (budgeted
cost of work performed) . Since completed tasks are considered
to have earned 100 percent of their BCWS, and tasks which have
not started are considered to have earned percent of their
BCWS, they are easy to measure. The major difficulty encoun-
tered in the determination of BCWP is, therefore, evaluation
of the in-process work [Ref . 16, p. 121] . In-process work
represents work tasks that have started, but are not completed
as of the reporting cut-off date.
The contractor's methodology for measuring earned value
should be objective, and based on physical work accomplish-
ment. There are essentially six distinct methods to measure
budgeted cost of work performed (BCWP) as follows:
1. The 50/50 technique- This technique is sometimes
utilized for work packages with a duration of two
accounting periods. 50 percent of the planned value
is earned when the activity starts, and the balance is
earned when the effort is complete.
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The 0/100 technique- This technique is best applied to
those work packages which are scheduled to start and
be completed within one accounting month. percent
is earned when the activity starts, but 100 percent is
earned when the activity is completed.
Percent complete- This techniques allows for a monthly
estimate of the percentage of work completed. This
estimate should ideally be accomplished by the work
project manager who is closest to the activity on-
going. This technique can be subjective but can be
made more objective with the establishment of
guidelines by the civilian project manager for percent
complete determination.
Milestone method- This technique works well when work
packages exceed three or more months in duration.
Objective milestones are established and the assigned
budget for the work package is divided up based on a
weighted value assigned to each milestone.
Equivalent and/or completed units- This technique is
often used for manufacturing efforts. It places a
given value on each unit completed or fractional
equivalent as the basis for setting the budget value
and earned value
.
Earned standards- This complex technique is sometimes
used for manufacturing efforts. It involves the prior
establishment of standards (based on motion studies,
historical performance, etc.) for the performance of
the tasks to be worked. The work in progress is then
evaluated based on these standards. [Ref. 7: pp. 122-
124]
J. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
After contract award and prior to the start of contract
work, the project manager should also establish a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) with Defense Contract Management Area
Operations Program and Technical Support personnel who are
assigned as matrix support to provide contract administrative
services for the project. An MOA will ensure DCMAO personnel
clearly understand the extent of their C/SSR surveillance
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responsibilities for the contract. It specifies any special
PM requests including particular surveillance tasks, surveil-
lance frequency, and the manner or format surveillance
information is to be presented to the PM. As emphasised by
one experienced PM, the DCMAO Program and Technical Support
personnel should be managed and cultivated as an extention of
the project management team [Ref . 24 :p. 40]
.
Typical surveillance duties for Program and Technical
Support personnel include monitoring C/SSR contract require-
ments, assuring that the contractor submits timely, reliable,
and valid reports, and providing independent C/SSR analysis to
the project manager. Other surveillance actions include the
follow-up and monitoring of any contractor corrective actions,
reconciliation of the C/SSR data to the contractor' s internal
data, monitoring the contract to ensure contractual require-
ments are met, and verification that contract changes are




This chapter provided the reader with an understanding of
the importance of management involvement during the preaward
process. It described the actions that should be taken to
ensure good C/SSR implementation. It also discussed baseline
establishment and maintenance, and its role in cost and
schedule management. Finally, Chapter III described the
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contractor plant visit, and the DCMAO' s role in cost and
schedule management surveillance.
Chapter IV will discuss C/SSR analysis, including earned
value measurement, and data trend analysis. It will describe
management actions that could be taken based on C/SSR data
analysis. Finally, it will discuss reprogramming and its
effect on cost and schedule management
.
42
IV. COST/SCHEDULE STATUS REPORT ANALYSIS
AND MANAGEMENT ACTIONS
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
Chapter IV will provide the reader with the basic tools
necessary for C/SSR analysis. It will discuss the importance
of C/SSR analysis, and how it can be used for project cost and
schedule management. Finally, the chapter will describe some
management actions the PM can take if a contractor is over
cost and behind schedule, including the affect reprogramming
has on the C/SSR.
B. C/SSR ANALYSIS: PURPOSE
Cost/Schedule Status Report analysis provides valuable
management information to the project manager. It provides
the project manager with indications of project cost overruns
and schedule slippage, enabling the PM to take timely correc-
tive action. Report trend analysis allows the project
manager to evaluate the effects of corrective actions by
indicating whether cost and schedule variances are improving
or getting worse. Report trend analysis also provides the
project manager with a forecast of the estimated cost of the
project at completion. This forecast provides the PM with an
early indication of a future project overrun. Thus, it is
important for the project manager to understand some basic
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tools and techniques used in C/SSR analysis, and to understand




Several basic cost and schedule performance factors are
included directly as entries within the contractor's
Cost/Schedule Status Report. Cost variance, which equals the
Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) minus the Actual Cost
of Work Performed (ACWP) , is indicated in column six of the
report for each work breakdown structure element . The cost
variance is summarized for the project at the bottom of column
six. A positive cost variance shows a favorable cost status
(underrun) , while a negative cost variance shows an overrun.
Schedule variance, which equals the Budgeted Cost of Work
Performed (BCWP) minus the Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled
(BCWS)
, is indicated in column five of the report by work
breakdown structure element . It is summarized at the bottom
of column five. The schedule variance is an indication of
whether work is accomplished as planned. A positive schedule
variance shows that work is ahead of schedule, while a
negative schedule variance shows work slippage. This can be
equated to time (days, months, etc.) by graphically comparing
the cumulative BCWP to the BCWS . It is important to remember
that a schedule variance is really a measure of in-process
work only. Work that has not started and work that is
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complete has no schedule variance. This makes the schedule
variance valuable as a performance indicator early in project
execution [Ref 26] . Often, schedule variances indicate the
first signs of project trouble.
Cost and schedule variances exceeding established manage-
ment threshold parameters must be explained in the contractor
narrative. They should be reviewed by the project manager,
and followed-up with the contractor, if necessary. Although
a proactive project manager will likely not be surprised by
the written explanation provided by the contractor for a cost
or schedule variance because of frequent communication between
himself and the contractor' s PM, the narrative section does
provide an official written explanation of problems and
contractor proposed actions
.
D. THE COST PERFORMANCE INDEX, TO COMPLETE PERFORMANCE INDEX,
AND THE SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE INDEX
A Cost Performance Index (CPI) , calculated from C/SSR
information, provides the project manager an indication of
project cost efficiency. It is a ratio of accomplishment to
incurred cost. The CPI is equal to the BCWP divided by the
ACWP
. A CPI of one indicates that the program is on cost,
while a CPI of less than one indicates the program is over-
cost. If a project's CPI was 1.2, this would mean that for
every dollar invested, the return is $1.20. The larger the
CPI, the greater the cost efficiency. Obviously, a CPI
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greater than one is desirable; however, an overly large CPI
needs to be viewed in context with other factors to ensure
that efficiency is not achieved at the expense of quality or
technical performance
.
The CPI index has proven to be stable after a contract is
more than 50 percent complete [Ref . 28] . This means that the
CPI index will not vary by more than +/- 10 percent in the
second half of project execution. For example, if a contrac-
tor has a CPI index of .75 at the midpoint of contract
execution, the best his CPI index could be is .825 at contract
completion. Thus, a CPI index of less than .91 when a project
is 50 percent complete would indicate a likely contract
overrun. This factor allows the PM to predict contract cost
overruns with confidence
.
The "To Complete Performance Index (TCPI) " is used to
determine the efficiency required to achieve the Budget at
Completion (BAC)
. It takes the cost efficiency experienced to
date (CPI) and determines, based on funds and work remaining,
the level of performance efficiency required for the remainder
of the contract to stay within the BAC. The calculation is as
follows
:
TCPI= BAC - BCWP CUM / BAC - ACWP CUM
This index can also be calculated using the contractor
provided Latest Revised Estimate (LRE) . This calculation
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would show the efficiency required for the remainder of the
contract to achieve the LRE . This calculation is as follows:
TCPI= BAC - BCWP CUM / LRE - ACWP CUM
Both calculations provide the PM with an objective evaluation
of required contractor efficiency.
A Schedule Performance Index (SPI) is calculated from C/SSR
information to provide the project manager an indication of
project schedule efficiency. The SPI is equal to the BCWP
divided by the BCWS . An SPI of one indicates that the work is
on schedule. A schedule performance index of less than one
may indicate problems in schedule and should be investigated.
The project manager should know why schedule slippage oc-
curred, what actions the contractor is taking to correct
schedule problems, and have a feel for the impact, if any,
that schedule problems will have on meeting a major milestone.
The project manager needs to be cautioned, however, of the
potential distortions of schedule variances and SPI indices.
"By itself, the C/SSR schedule variance reveals no "critical
path" information, and may be misleading because unfavorable
accomplishment in some areas can be offset by favorable
accomplishment in others [Ref. 16: p. 179]. nl Also, since a
C/SSR schedule represents the "planned" period for the defined
work tasks, this period may or may not precisely coincide with
the program's overall schedule plan required to meet the
XA critical path is a sequential activity path which repre-
sents the longest duration of a contract. Any slippage of the
tasks in the critical path will increase contract duration.
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contractual obligation [Ref. 16: p. 181]. This occurs due to
schedule slack associated with non-critical path work package
elements that can be adjusted by the contractor, without
impact on the overall project completion date.
A reoccuring schedule variance, however, can be a valuable
and reliable indicator of long-term project trend. Negative
schedule variances do show that work did not get accomplished.
At some point unfinished work elements with slack become
critical items that can affect overall project completion. By
understanding the meaning and interpretation of schedule
variances and the SPI index, a project manager will have a
good grasp of contractor work progress
.
E. OTHER ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES AND PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
Another method used to analyze contractor performance is to
review the percentage of management reserve used by the
contractor. Although management reserve provides funds under
management control for the unforeseen and unbudgeted circum-
stances, excessive use of reserve funds early in the project
schedule could indicate management problems. Often, commit-
ment of the management reserve can be correlated with cost and
schedule variances . Since there is no specific guidance
quantifying excessive management reserve commitment, the
project manager should require further contractor explanation




Mr. Gary E. Christie, Deputy Director for Cost Management
in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition)
,
Acquisition Policy & Program Integration, has determined that,
given a contract that is more than 15 percent complete,
overrun at completion will not be less than the overrun to
date. Also, the percent overrun at completion will be greater
than the percent of overrun to date. Essentially, the
contractor cannot recover from a cost overrun status after 15
percent of contract execution. Mr. Christie explains that if
you underestimated near term planning, there is no hope that
you will do better on far term planning. He bases his
findings on analysis of hundreds of DoD contracts. Mr.
Christie's precept has been verified by DSMC. This factor
provides the PM with another early indicator of a project
overrun. [Ref . 16:pp. 271-272] Another indicator of potential
cost and schedule problems is "perfect" C/SSR information.
Perfect data means that there are virtually no cost or
schedule variances with any of the reported CWBS elements.
The budgeted cost for all work and the budgeted schedule for
all work is equal to the actual cost of all work. Since this
situation is highly unlikely, perfect C/SSR information would
call into question the validity of contractor data, or suggest
front-loading or rubber baselining. The project manager
experiencing this situation should insist on a DCMAO review of
the contractor's internal cost and schedule management system
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to verify report validity, or a review of contracting account-
ing records by the Defense Contract Audit Agency.
F. THE ESTIMATE AT COMPLETION
The Estimate at Completion (EAC) quantifies the forecasted
costs to complete the project. The contractor's Latest
Revised Estimate (LRE) from column eight of the C/SSR serves
as his current Estimate at Completion. The EAC or LRE
consists of the total dollar value of work to date, plus the
estimate of the cost of the work remaining. Due to the
inherent optimistic tendency of the contractor's LRE, the
project office's cost and schedule report analyst should
calculate an Estimate at Completion for the contract.
There are various methods that can be used to develop an
Estimate at Completion. While it is not necessary for the
project manager to become an expert on all the various EAC
calculation variations, it is important for him to understand
the basis for EAC computations . Sometimes it is helpful for
the project manager to ask his analyst to submit to him
several EAC calculations, using different techniques, or using
different assumptions. The PM could also request that the
DCMAO Program and the Technical Support analyst assigned to
support the project, provide him with an EAC using a different
approach than his project analyst. This will give the PM a
range of pessimistic to optimistic EACs . The PM can then
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select the EAC he feels is most accurate based on his know-
ledge of the contractor.
The most basic formula for calculating an EAC is to add the
actual cost of work performed to date (ACWPcum) to the
budgeted value of the work remaining to be accomplished on the
contract . The budgeted value of work remaining to be accom-
plished is equal to the budget at completion (BAC) minus the
cumulative budgeted cost of work performed (BCWPcum) . This
formula is
:
EAC = (ACWPcum) + (BAC - BCWPcum)
This formula considers all cost overruns to date, but treats
all overruns as non-recurrent . The work remaining value
assumes that the contractor will work at 100 percent effici-
ency in the future and any overruns will not reoccur.
Since this is seldom the case, the EAC is most often
calculated by adding the cumulative actual cost of work
performed to the budgeted value of work remaining on the
contract times an estimated efficiency factor (EF) expected of
the contractor. This formula is:
EAC = (ACWPcum) + (EF) (BAC - BCWPcum)
There are several common methods to calculate the con-
tractor' s efficiency factor. The most common and easiest
51
method is to use the contractor's cumulative CPI [Ref 11].
Here, the EAC calculation would be:
EAC = BAC / Cum CPI
This method assumes that the contractor will do all of the
work remaining on the contract at the cost rate depicted by
the CPI [Ref 14: p. 7]. Another variation on using the Cum
CPI is to use a moving average of recent CPIs from over the
last three to 12 months . This method involves increased
effort as the C/SSR reflects cumulative information. It does,
however, divorce the EAC calculation from use of historical
data that may not represent current performance. The use of
a current month CPI as a performance factor is not recommended
since it tends to be volatile and potentially distorting [Ref
26] .
Finally, the performance factor can be calculated using a
weighted average of the Cost Performance Index and the
Schedule Performance Index. Mr. Greg Maust, an experienced
project management consultant recommends the use of an 80
percent weighted CPI and a 20 percent weighed SPI. This
weighted average could be modified over the course of the
contract to reflect the relative importance of cost versus
schedule. For example, at the inception of a contract, the
most important aspects might be schedule but as the contract
progresses, the emphasis may be placed on cost [Ref 27: p.
11] . The danger in using this approach is the subjectivity
associated with assigning weight. Also, a weighted average
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that is changed arbitrarily, or changed to suit the situation,
can distort the Estimate At Completion.
G. GRAPHING ANALYSIS/TREND ANALYSIS
An excellent tool to evaluate cost and schedule trends is
graphing. When graphed, cost and schedule cumulative informa-
tion provide the project manager with an excellent, simple
visual tool to evaluate cost and schedule trends . It also
provides an effective and versatile way to summarize an
enormous amount of data [Ref . 13 :p. 28] . In addition, graphs
provide the project manager with a visual history of his
project. Finally, graphical trend analysis is used routinely,
and endorsed by the current Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition (USDA) , Mr. Yockey. His keen interest in the use
of cost and schedule graphs has sparked their widespread use
in project management.
There are several graphs that are particularly helpful to
the PM. The most common graph is the Cumulative Plan/Status
Display. This graph shows by month, actual costs (ACWP)
,
actual accomplishment (BCWP) , and planned accomplishment
(BCWS) . Cost variance is shown as the difference between the
BCWP and ACWP curves, while schedule variance is shown as the
difference between the BCWP and BCWS curves . Appendix C
contains a sample Cumulative Plan/Status Display graph.
The Cumulative Plan/Status Display graph is usually
represented by a "S-shaped" curve, which portrays a slow
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project build-up, faster project acceleration near the middle,
and a slow tapered-down end [Ref . 16: p. 256] . Any cumulative
program curve that does not approximate this "S" shape is
highly suspect of displaying a faulty plan [Ref. 16: p. 256].
If the PM extends a line from the displayed actual cost curve,
following the "S-shaped" pattern, he can project an estimated
cost for the project at completion. Similarly, if the PM
extends a line from the actual accomplishment curve, he can
obtain an estimate of the budgeted cost at completion for the
project. This graphical trend analysis technique enables the
PM to project contract overruns and project completion
slippage
.
Other commonly used graphs for trend analysis are the Cost
Variance Graph and the Schedule Variance Graph. The Cost
Variance Graph shows the cost variance over time. The cost
variance can be depicted as a monthly or cumulative variance.
Similarly, the Schedule Variance Graph shows the schedule
variance over time. It also can be depicted monthly or
cumulatively. Appendix D contains sample Cumulative Cost and
Schedule Variance Graphs . Both graphs represent a visual
technique for PM evaluation of contractor efficiency over
time
.
A variation of these graphs is the plotting of the CPI or
SPI indices over time. These also could be depicted as
monthly or cumulative variances. Again, these graphs provide
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another visual aide for the PM to evaluate contractor effi-
ciency.
Management reserve usage is also often graphed. The
Management Reserve graph often displays the cumulative
management reserve usage, the cumulative cost variance and the
cumulative schedule variance over time. This graph shows the
PM the relationship between management reserve application,
and cumulative cost and schedule variances. As mentioned
previously in this chapter, early commitment of management
reserve is often an early indication of cost or schedule
problems . Appendix E contains a sample Management Reserve
graph
.
H. PERFORMANCE ANALYZER SOFTWARE USE IN C/SSR ANALYSIS
Performance Analyzer (PA) was developed by Thomas/Scifers
Inc., for the Air Force Space Systems Command to streamline
and automate cost and schedule reporting and analysis . It was
designed to meet the needs of program managers, financial
analysts, and project engineers [Ref . 29 :p. i] . Over the past
few years, PA has been introduced to all military services and
is rapidly becoming the standard cost and schedule analysis
software package used throughout DoD. Performance Analyzer is
user-friendly and menu driven. It supports IBM/XT/AT compati-
ble computers; EGA, Hercules, or VGA graphic cards; IBM or
Epson compatible printers and Hewlett Packard laserjet
printers; DOS 3.2 or higher; and the Hewlett-Packard plotter.
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The system also requires a hard drive with a minimum of 485K
RAM. Performance Analyzer can perform a wide variety of
computations, including:
1. Mathematical checks for data errors
2
.
Percent complete by WBS element
3 Current and cumulative cost and schedule variance
4. CPIs and SPIs for current and cumulative data
5 Variance at Completion
6 To Complete Performance Index
7 EAC calculations using weighted indices and three
month moving averages. [Ref. 25: pp. 33-34]
Performance Analyzer can also display, print, and plot
cost and schedule management graphs for project management




Cumulative or current cost or schedule variances in
dollars




5. Percent complete (percent dollars spent versus
percent complete)
6 EACs
7. Management Reserve [Ref. 29:pp. 6-13 to 6-26]
In addition, cumulative or current cost or schedule variances
and indices can be displayed for CWBS elements as well as for
the total project.
Performance Analyzer also prepares several reports that are
useful for the non-major program cost and schedule manager.
It will also prepare the C/SSR itself including the C/SSR
contractor analysis section. Among the reports PA can prepare
are
:
1. A Management Reserve Status report: This report
displays BCWP versus the amount of Management Reserve
remaining for the last six months. [Ref. 29 :p. 6-32]
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2. A Program Manager Summary report: This report
displays the CWBS performance data for all elements
for a selected month. [Ref. 29 :p. 6-35]
3. Executive Summary report: This report is a one page
report that displays important contractual and




Six Period report : This report displays the last six
months of performance data and related forecasts-to-
complete for a WBS element. [Ref. 29: p. 6-30]
Performance Analyzer also has the capability to support
on-line automated data transfer with a contractor or higher
command. This aspect significantly reduces the time required
for project analyst manual data entries. According to a
senior DoD official within the USD (A) Acquisition Policy and
Program Integration Office, the Government can even specify
Performance Analyzer use in the Request for Proposal, and
provide a copy of PA to the contractor [Ref. 13]. This
reduces cost and schedule management costs for the contractor
and further standardizes cost and schedule management software
usage
I. MANAGEMENT ACTIONS
There are no guaranteed "cookbook" methods available to a
project manager to use as problems arise. However, there are
several management actions that the PM can take short of
contract termination, once problems are identified through
C/SSR review and analysis. Naturally, careful PM vigilence to
avoid or "catch" problems early is preferred. In all cases,
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the PM should tailor his management actions based on his
assessment of the project's situation.
Once the project manager has identified cost or schedule
variances through review and analysis of the contractor's
C/SSR, he should carefully review the contractor's C/SSR
narrative comments. The project manager should be satisfied
with the explanations provided by the contractor for all
variances exceeding thresholds, or seek further contractor
explanation. The contractor should have clearly stated in his
narrative the cause of the specific problem, its impact on the
immediate task and on the total program, the actions he has
taken to correct the problem, and an estimated timeframe
within which the problem will be corrected [Ref 25. p. 6]
.
The project manager should not hesitate to conduct follow-
up communication with the contractor to clarify further
aspects of the contractor's narrative and to discuss problem
corrections. The project manager also should recognize that
problems are not always the fault of the contractor. Delays
in delivery of Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) and
technical problems with GFE are among the most common Govern-
ment induced problems
.
Although there can be a variety of reasons variances occur,
it is helpful for the project manager to be familiar with some
common causes. The project manager needs to decide whether he
feels that the variance is due to a "one-time" mistake or
circumstance, or whether there is an underlying systemic
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problem. The most common causes for unfavorable variances are
poor management, poor initial planning or estimating, techni-
cal problems, higher cost of materials or labor than expected,
material delivery problems, and sometimes, poor weather.
Favorable variances can be attributed to poor management
initial planning or estimating (overly conservative approach)
,
technical breakthroughs, or lower cost of materials and labor
than anticipated. Variances (both positive and negative) can
also appear due to the different way contractors measure
earned value for open work packages as discussed previously in
Chapter III.
After the project manager has reviewed the contractor's
narrative and discussed the situation with the contractor, he
may want to conduct an on-site investigation to further his
understanding of the problem (s) . He can request assistance to
conduct additional contractor surveillance from the DCMAO
program and technical support personnel assigned to support
his project. He also can request assistance from the Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to review contractor accounting
records
.
Once the PM has a good understanding of the cause (s) for
cost and schedule variances and has discussed the situation
with the contractor, he should continue to monitor contractor
corrective actions . The project manager should require the
contractor to brief him regularly on his corrective plan's
progress and should evaluate the contractor's progress
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objectively based on subsequent monthly C/SSR analysis. The
PM should recognize that contractors tend to be "optimistic"
about their project to avoid potential project cancellation.
The PM should not hesitate to keep his management informed
of cost and schedule problems and corrective actions taken.
Sometimes, it is extremely effective for the PM to request
that his manager express performance concerns directly to the
contractor's PM, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or other senior
official. One PM was particularly effective in using this
technique. Using C/SSR trend analysis, the PM identified
contractor cost and schedule problems within the first six
months of a four year contact . After continued poor perfor-
mance and no problem improvement, the PM asked his Program
Executive Officer (PEO) to visit the contractor's facility and
express his dissatisfaction with the contractor's project
manager and CEO. This action expressed senior officer concern
and served as a catalyst for contractor corrective action.
The project's Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) also
assesses contractor performance in his review of a contracto-
r's progress payment requests. The ACO will use C/SSR data
and trend analysis to decide whether the contractor should
receive progress payments as requested, or whether progress
payments should either be partially or totally withheld due to
a lack of work progress. Although the PM is not directly
involved in progress payment review, he can influence the
ACO' s decision by expressing his assessment of the con-
60
tractor's progress to the ACO through the PM' s PCO. The PM
needs to, therefore, understand the potential advantages and
disadvantages of partially or totally withholding progress
payments . The PM' s PCO should advise the PM on this important
issue
.
Withholding progress payments has the advantage of express-
ing serious concern regarding the contractor's performance.
It heightens contractor management attention by endangering
his cash flow and potential profits . Sometimes even the mere
threat of withholding progress payments is enough to motivate
the contractor to take decisive management action.
Withholding progress payments, however, can seriously
affect the contractor's cash flow. This can be a disadvan-
tage, especially for a highly leveraged contractor. It takes
cash to correct problems. Thus, without a sufficient cash
flow, a contractor could be strapped for funds to continue
project work as planned. This may exascerbate the poor
performance problem and could lead to more serious actions
such as contract termination.
J. REPROGRAMMING : THE OVER TARGET BASELINE
If cost and schedule problems persist on a contract, and
the contractor decides that the amount of budget remaining is
decidedly insufficient to accommodate the remaining work, the
contractor may propose to the PM implementation of an over
target baseline (OTB) . An over target baseline, or "repro-
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gramming, " is when a contractor requests approval to manage to
a goal above the contract target cost. It results in the
contractor's total allocated budget (TAB) exceeding his
contract budget base (CBB) [Ref. 22:p. 15]. It also results
in a major restructuring of contractor efforts. It is a
formal declaration of an overrun by the contractor.
An over target baseline may only be implemented a maximum
of once a year and only with Government PM approval . It may
not be implemented if the project has six months or less
remaining . Before approving a contractor reprogramming
request, the PM should be confident of the following:
1
.
The contractor has an adequate cost and schedule
control system.
2 The contract budget remaining is clearly inadequate to
perform the remaining work.
3. The remaining authorized work can be determined.
4. The remaining authorized work can be scheduled.
5 The contractor clearly understands the reason leading
to the overrun
.
6. The contractor has a plan of action to prevent
problems from reoccurring [Ref. 31: p. 105].
7 The contractor has detailed estimates of all costs
necessary to complete the contract and has clearly
identified the additional budget required.
8
.
He can obtain additional funding for the reprogramming
request
.
Obviously, the PM should not regard reprogramming requests
lightly. Reprogramming should not be accomplished simply to
eliminate variances for work already accomplished [Ref. 15: p.
4-12]
.
However, once a baseline is no longer representative
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of project work, performance reports are often ignored and
program managers may resort to other informal means of
tracking the contract [Ref. 30:p. 5]. Also, by continuing
project execution under an unrealistic baseline, the PM loses
visibility of new problems [Ref 11] . Reprogramming allows the
PM to focus on new problems by resetting cost and schedule
variances to zero. The PM still has visibility of old
problems through the contractor's submission of a latest
revised estimate (LRE) with his C/SSR. A reprogrammed project
LRE would indicate an estimated overrun for remaining work
[Ref. 11]
.
The PM also can retain visibility on total cost variances
by calculating the ratio between the total allocated budget
before reprogramming and the total allocated budget after
reprogramming. He could then multiply the BCWP and BCWS
elements shown in columns two and three of the C/SSR, by the
ratio to obtain the project's total cost variance. Some
project managers choose to graph the cost variance both with
and without this ratio to focus on the contractor's perfor-
mance following reprogramming, while retaining visibility of
total project cost variances. [Ref. 32]
Another approach the PM can take to ensure he retains
visibility of the total contract cost variance is to specify
in the contract solicitation that the contractor provide
reprogramming adjustment reporting with his monthly C/SSR
[Ref. 15:p. 4-11]. This is a standard reporting requirement
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in the Cost Performance Report used in cost and schedule
reporting for major programs. This would require the con-
tractor to indicate the budget adjustment applicable to each
reported WBS element . It also would require him to show the
total cost variance for each reported WBS element. However,
before requiring the contractor to submit reprogramming
adjustment reporting, the PM should weigh the additional
financial costs associated with the additional reporting,
against his management need for total cost variance visibi-
lity.
It is important for the PM to approve an OTB in a timely
manner. Generally, OTB approval should be granted within 60
days after the contractor's request submission [Ref. 10 :p.
3.4-11]
. Since the contractor cannot move to his new plan
without PM approval, approval delays may make the contractor's
new proposed plan obsolete before it can be implemented [Ref.
30:p. 4] .
K. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has provided the reader with an understanding
of the basic tools needed to conduct C/SSR analysis. It has
provided an understanding of trend analysis by familiarizing
the reader with some commonly used graphical techniques . The
chapter also exposed the reader to the capabilities of
Performance Analyzer software and described its use in project
management. Finally, Chapter IV has discussed several
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management actions the PM can take once he has identified cost
and schedule problems
.
Chapter V will analyze how the Navy' s A-12 Avenger program
termination has affected the C/SSR environment. It will
examine Army, Navy, Air Force, and OSD cost and schedule
management initiatives taken since the A-12 termination. It
will analyze some of these initiatives and identify lessons
learned. Finally, it will propose recommendations for future
cost and schedule management initiatives
.
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V. THE A-12'S AFFECT ON THE C/SSR ENVIRONMENT.
INITIATIVES TAKEN, LESSONS LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR FUTURE INITIATIVES
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
On 8 January 1991, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Dick
Cheney, terminated the Navy's A-12 Avenger program. At that
time, the A-12 was one billion dollars over its target cost
and, as expressed by Mr. Cheney, "No one can tell me exactly
how much more it will cost to keep this program going" [Ref
.
33 :p. 1] . Among other issues, both the contractors and the
Navy were found to have made inadequate use of cost and
schedule data for project management. As concluded by the
Beach Administrative Inquiry, "existing control mechanisms,
properly operated, would have been sufficient to identify the
nature and extent of the problems in this contract..." [Ref.
34, p. 33] . As a direct result of the A-12's termination,
both the A-12 Program Manager and PEO for Tactical Aircraft
Programs, were relieved of their duties.
The A-12's "demise" sent shock waves throughout the Defense
acquisition community. Through this highly visible contract
termination, Mr. Cheney sent a clear message that cost and
schedule management is so important that if a PM fails to use
prudent management practices, his program can and will be
canceled [Ref. 35 :p. 2]. This has led to a heightened OSD
interest in cost and schedule management and a number of
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actions throughout DoD to strengthen cost and schedule control
practices
.
Although there are no specific actions that have been
directed solely at non-major projects, there have been many
reforms directed at cost and schedule practices initiated by
all three military services and OSD that have affected non-
major acquisitions. These actions suggest a renewed interest
in improving cost and schedule management throughout DoD.
This chapter will describe these reforms, analyze their impact
on the C/SSR environment, and discuss any applicable lessons
learned from A-12 termination.
B. USD (A) /OSD INITIATIVES
The selection of The Honorable Donald J. Yockey as the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) , shortly after the
resignation of Mr. John Betti, was the most visible and
powerful action taken by the Secretary of Defense to emphasize
cost and schedule management. It is speculated that Mr. Betti
resigned due to the problems leading to the A-12's termina-
tion. Mr. Yockey, the Deputy USD (A) under Mr. Betti, is a
strong advocate of performance management . His personal
interest in promoting the use of earned value as a productive
management approach for defense contracts has resulted in a
renewed interest in its use throughout the DoD acquisition
community, including non-major project management [Ref. p:
15] .
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This renewed interest was evident at the 1991 National
C/SCSC Workshop. This workshop attracted a record attendance
of 641 participants from both DoD and defense contractors.
Mr. Yockey' s keynote address at the workshop was a highly
visible example of the value he places on cost and schedule
control management
.
Mr. Yockey has emphasized the need for increased perfor-
mance management training throughout DoD. One initiative was
the establishment of a new billet within the Office of
Acquisition Policy, Program Integration and Cost Management.
An Army Lieutenant Colonel currently fills this position. Mr.
Yockey has charged this officer with the responsibility to
improve cost and schedule management education, starting with
a review of the earned value content of all DoD acquisition
training and education [Ref l:p. 18].
This review of DoD acquisition training and education has
revealed significant shortfalls in earned value education.
One of the findings was that often a PM' s first formal
training in cost and schedule management was during attendance
at the DSMC Program Manager's Course [ref. 36] . The review
also revealed that from 1987 to 1989, the Air Force Institute
of Technology' s School of Systems and Logistics was only able
to meet 2 6-2 9 percent of enrollment requests for their cost
and schedule management courses, due to funding constraints
[Ref. 36]. Further, although requests for the Contractor
Performance Measurement Course at DSMC have doubled, annual
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course offerings were reduced from ten in 1991 to seven in
1992 due to budget constraints [Ref . 36]
.
This training review effort has contributed to the release
of three key Department of Defense publications. First, on 25
October 1991, Department of Defense Directive 5000.52, Defense
Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development
Program, was published. This publication updates policy and
responsibilities for a career development program for acquisi-
tion personnel. It also specifies the establishment of a
functional board to review DoD business, cost estimating, and
financial management education and training.
Second, on 15 November 1991, the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition) published the Career Development Program for
Acquisition Personnel Manual. This manual provides uniform
procedures for a DoD Career Development Program for Acquisi-
tion Personnel, consistent with the general policies and
authorities stated in DoD Directive 1430.2, Civilian Career
Management, and appropriate component civilian and military
personnel regulations [Ref. 38:p. i] . It also implements the
education and training programs authorized by Chapter 87 of
Title 10, United States Code [Ref. 38:p. i] . This document
clearly specifies required training by acquisition discipline
and by career level, including mandatory and desired perfor-
mance management training, experience, and education.
Third, OSD staff efforts have contributed to the publica-
tion of Department of Defense Instruction 5000.58, Defense
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Acquisition Workforce on 14 January 1992. This document
establishes policy, assigns responsibility, and prescribes
procedures and criteria for designating acquisition positions
and critical acquisition positions, for management of the
acquisition workforce, and for establishing and managing the
Acquisition Corps [Ref. 39p: 1]
.
Currently, there is an effort at the Department of Defense
to "fence" funding for acquisition education including
performance management courses. This action would alleviate
training fund cuts at both AFIT and DSMC . Until this occurs,
shortfalls are likely to remain in cost and schedule manage-
ment education.
Renewed DoD interest in performance management training has
also sparked a substantial increase in correspondence course
and training seminar requests . Requests for the Contractor
Performance Measurement correspondence course at DSMC have
doubled during the past year [Ref. 11] . Also, because of
significant demand, Policy Analysts from the Office of
Acquisition Policy, Program Integration, and Cost Management
tripled the number of cost and schedule management training
seminars they teach to project office personnel [Ref. l:p.
18] .
Finally, Mr. Yockey's interest in cost and schedule
analysis has resulted in the formation of a Tri-Service and
Defense Logistics Agency Panel for Performance Analyzer (PA)
software. This panel centralizes funding for PA version
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updates, serves as a focal point for PA problems and issues,
and centralizes PA distribution. Currently, this panel is
working on PA upgrades that will incorporate additional
standardized management briefing charts
.
C. NAVY INITIATIVES
Of the three military services, it appears that Navy has
taken the most action to strengthen cost and schedule control.
On 14 March 1991, pursuant to the A-12 Administrative Inquiry
recommendations, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Re-
search, Development, and Acquisition (ASN (RD&A) ) , chartered a
Cost Performance Analysis Working Group (CPAWG) . This working
group was tasked to identify and report recommended actions
necessary to revitalize Navy cost performance analysis. The
group reviewed cost performance analysis policies, processes
and capabilities currently in place and conducted extensive
interviews. [Ref. 40:p. 4].
The Cost Performance Analysis Working Group identified
twenty two recommendations to strengthen cost and schedule
management throughout the Navy . Their findings and recommen-
dations were grouped into four major areas; leadership
commitment, policy and guidance, training, and resources.
1 . Leadership Commitment
Among the recommendations regarding leadership commit-
ment affecting C/SSR management is the development of an early
warning system to support PMs and all Navy acquisition
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executives. This warning system would use red, yellow, or
green assessment criteria based upon cost and schedule
performance indices (CPI and SPI) and variance-at-completion
(VAC) percent. A yellow condition would require a report by
the PM to his next management level. Similarly, a red
condition would require a report by the PM to his next
management level and to the program Milestone Decision
Authority. A green condition would not require any special
reporting to higher management. [Ref. 40:pp. 17-20]
Leadership commitment recommendations also included a
recommendation for the ASN (RD&A) to publish an expectations
policy memorandum to all PEOs and PMs, emphasizing his
requirement for senior managers to know and use cost and
schedule analysis in project management. The working group
also recommended that the ASN (RD&A) require C/SSR or CPR
summary data presentation at regular program reviews and
reinforce the need for regular on-site contractor cost and
schedule surveillance and independent analysis by DCMAO or
DPRO personnel. In addition, the group recommended that the
Navy establish a multi-functional working group to explore the
development of an integrated, real-time program management
information system. [Ref. 40:pp. 17-20]
2. Policy and Guidance
Among the policy recommendations specified was the
establishment of uniform cost performance management and
analysis requirements at all System Commands (SYSCOMS) for all
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Acquisition Category (ACAT) programs, the requirement for
project offices to coordinate WBS development with their
central SYSCOM, and the establishment of uniform cost perfor-
mance analysis summary data at each echelon of acquisition
oversight. Other policy recommendations included a require-
ment for the use of electronic data transfer of cost perfor-
mance management data for all new contracts and the require-
ment for PMs to require contractor briefings on monthly cost





Training recommendations included the need for a review
and survey of cost and schedule management training require-
ments and school request shortfalls, and the requirement for
all program business/financial managers to attend the AFIT two
week cost and schedule management course. Also recommended
was the review and establishment of WBS training requirements.
Finally, recommendations were made that acquisition commands
require, implement, and track employee cost and schedule
management training. [Ref. 40:pp. 27-29]
4 Resources
Resource recommendations included the establishment of
centralized cost performance measurement organizations within
each Systems Command and in matrix organizations supporting
project offices, and that funds be identified and provided
to support these focal point organizations. Finally, the
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working group advocated the establishment of Performance
Analyzer as the Navy standard cost and schedule management
information system. [Ref. 40:pp. 30-33]
These recommendations are currently awaiting final review
and approval by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, RD&A, the
Honorable Gerald A. Cann. However, revitalization efforts
have been initiated within several of the Navy SYSCOMS . For
example, the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) has estab-
lished and conducted a command cost performance measurement
and analysis training program for PEOs, PMs, program office
staff members, and other key senior management within NAVAIR
[Ref. 40:p. 4]. Although the course was limited to several
hours of training, it provided training in fundamental cost
and schedule management concepts
.
The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) has also conducted
a five day performance management training course targeted at
its 21 cost estimating personnel [Ref. 40 :p. 5] . In addition,
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, (RD&A) C/SCSC focal point
commmissioned a tailored, executive version of the one week
DSMC "Contract Performance Measurement Course." Key senior
Navy acquisition personnel and PEO staff members attended this
seminar. [Ref. 40:p. 5].
D. ARMY INITIATIVES
The Army has taken several initiatives as a result of
increased performance management emphasis following the A-12
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termination. The Honorable Stephen K. Conver, Assistant
Secretary of the Army (RD&A) , directed a study of current Army
cost and schedule management practices. The study group
solicited input from senior Army leadership, PEOs, and senior
staff members . The group generated 63 pages of input that was
categorized into ten issue areas. The Army identified an
expert for each issue area. These experts provided comments
based on this input . The study concluded that no additional
controls were required, that the Army should continue the
thrust of their current performance management program, and
that Army PEOs/PMs were the first line of defense against
problems similar to the A-12 . The study did advocate the
promotion of proper sensitivity and vigilance in cost and
schedule management and recommended the implementation of four
actions to accomplish this goal. [Ref. 41: pp. 1-5].
The first recommendation was to develop an independent and
effective program assessment capability at the Army Acquisi-
tion Executive (AAE) level. The second recommendation was to
revise PEO/PM charters to clarify and strengthen their duties
in cost and schedule management . The third recommendation was
to require special management of joint ventures and other
teaming arrangements to provide for the "fixing" of corporate
responsibility for problems. The final recommendation was to
establish local "lessons learned" reading files. These files
would provide common sense advice to PMs and their staffs . It
is the researcher's opinion that this measure is not very
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substantive and will have little impact on improving Army cost
and schedule management
.
Mr. Conver approved all recommendations except the indepen-
dent program assessment capability at the AAE level . It was
felt that this independent team would provide an unwarranted
level of "checkers" at the AAE level. Also, the Assistant
Secretary of the Army, Research, Development, and Acquisition
(SARDA) staff could not afford to commit assigned personnel
assets to compose this team, and funding constraints prevented
the establishment of new billets for this function. [Ref 42] .
Mr. Conver summarized the adopted initiatives in a memorandum
dated 7 October 1991, "Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) Policy
Memorandum #91-7, "A-12 Lessons Learned [Ref. 43:p. 1]."
Mr. Conver also expressed his concern about cost and
schedule management in both the September-October 1991 and
November-December 1991 issues of the Army Research, Develop-
ment & Acquisition Bulletin. Both articles reflect his
emphasis on major program management. The articles have
implied messages for smaller, C/SSR managed projects. As he
stated in the September-October issue, "In the future, we can
no longer afford to overrun program schedules or exceed
budgets" [Ref. 46:p. 45]. He asserts that cost and schedule
management techniques can help avoid such problems if managers
understand and pay attention to the performance management
information [Ref. 46:p. 45].
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In the November-December issue, Mr. Conver advocated
contract management as a team effort involving the ACO, PCO,
as well as the PM and PEO [Ref . 47 :p. 52] . He also emphasized
that the contractor's performance must be carefully monitored
to provide early problem detection [Ref. 47:p. 52].
E. AIR FORCE INITIATIVES
The Air Force has also increased its emphasis on cost and
schedule management. In particular, the Air Force Systems
Command (AFSC) has taken several initiatives to promote
performance management. Lieutenant General Thomas R. Fer-
guson, Commander, Air Force Systems Command, demonstrated his
concern about cost and schedule management in a memorandum
dated 17 December 1990, "Inspector General Report on A-12
Program." This memorandum emphasized the need for the Air
Force to learn from the A-12's errors to prevent their
reoccurrence [Ref. 44:p. 1] . The Air Force Systems Command
has also reorganized its cost management division to include
the establishment of an analysis branch and implemented a
quarterly cost and schedule management training program.
The Air Force is also experimenting with acquisition
innovations in its F-22, Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF)
Program. The contractors were freed from binding, rigid
specifications. Also, the ATF project office assigned
military project teams to work with the contractors. Each
project team has responsibility for all aspects of a particu-
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lar component from drawing board to manufacturing. The teams
work closely with the contractor to ensure program require-
ments are met on schedule and at cost. The ATF project office
also instituted a cost and schedule "flash report" that
provides the PM timely insight into potential problem areas
within 10 working days after accounting close. This "flash"
report is an unaudited CPR (format one)
.
It is unsure exactly how these ATF innovations will affect
non-major project offices. At this stage of development it is
obvious that the increased communication and cooperation
between Government and industry evident in this project could
provide a role model for other programs including non-major
acquisitions. Also, since the "flash" report provides the PM
timely notification of project cost and schedule information,
its use should be explored for C/SSR managed projects.
Perhaps lessons learned on ATF specification reductions and
project teams can result in future initiatives benefiting all
projects
.
F. LESSONS LEARNED FOR NON-MAJOR PROGRAMS/ COMMENTS/ RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR FUTURE INITIATIVES
Perhaps the greatest shortfall evident from the A-12
"fallout" was the lack of a coordinated training effort
throughout DoD . Although AFIT and DSMC each provided cost and
schedule management education, there was no central attempt to
quantify training needs or shortfalls, identify personnel
78
requiring training, or "mission" essential tasks for each
school to teach. It was obvious through the researcher's
visit to each school that both DSMC and AFIT have a cadre of
professional, dedicated personnel who are attempting to
provide the best training, given available resources.
However, without a comprehensive review of all cost and
schedule training and an identification of all personnel who
require training, it is difficult to quantify performance
management training requirements and justify additional
funding. A coordinated OSD-led focus is required to orches-
trate this effort.
Fortunately, OSD has assumed a definitive leadership role
in performance management training. The creation of the
billet within the USD (A) Cost Management Section to focus on
training requirements has contributed greatly to coordinating
training efforts. These efforts, previously described in this
chapter, provide a foundation for the future of performance
management education. However, without "fenced" funding for
identified Acquisition Enhancement Program and other acquisi-
tion courses that teach cost and schedule management as part
of their curriculum, the benefits of OSD's efforts will not be
realized.
It is obvious that voids of cost and schedule management
knowledge remain throughout DoD . The researcher confirmed
this fact through interviews with various personnel throughout
the acquisition community. This problem was particularly
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evident on smaller contracts. Project staffs on small R&D
contracts are often limited. The project manager of many of
these projects, particularly in the lab environments, is often
a senior engineer or scientist. These engineers and scien-
tists are often not formally trained or educated in the
business or financial aspects of contracts. Thus, they focus
their efforts on technical aspects, sometimes at the expense
of sound cost and schedule management. It is, therefore,
important for the military services to ensure that these
personnel also be identified to receive cost and schedule
management education and training.
The Navy, through its Revitalization Plan, clearly recog-
nizes the need for increased performance management training.
Of the three military services, it is attempting to take the
most definitive training actions. It is the researcher's
opinion, however that the Navy's requirement for acquisition
commands to require, implement, and track a one week employee
cost performance management training course is a burdensome
and complex requirement . Although educational opportunities
should always be encouraged, the Navy' s performance management
training requirements should be assimilated into a central DoD
focus to maintain quality teaching standards and course
standardization. If the Navy does implement this recommenda-
tion, its cost and management course should be assimilated as
part of the Defense Acquisition University structure.
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Declining military budgets will demand training innovation.
According to Rear Admiral Vincent, Commandant, Defense Systems
Management College, he is already exploring innovative
training approaches using video and satellite technology [Ref
.
45] . Another approach might be a requirement for students to
complete a basic cost and schedule control familiarization
correspondence course as a prerequisite to attendance at a
formal DoD performance management school . This would allow
resident class time to focus on more complex or detailed
aspects of cost and schedule management, while ensuring a
basic foundation of knowledge for all students.
Another training option for DoD to explore is the implemen-
tation of periodic on-site seminars at major service acquisi-
tion commands. These seminars could be taught by a cadre of
experience performance management instructors from AFIT or
DSMC, or could be contracted out to civilian cost and manage-
ment consultants . There are a number of highly experienced
management consultants qualified to conduct this training,
many with years of former DoD experience. These seminars
should be funded and scheduled by DoD. If possible, these
seminars should also be open to contractor PMs and their
staffs [Ref. 32]. This action would further communication
between Government and contractor program offices, while
promoting performance management education.
A final innovative teaching idea is the development and
implementation of a DoD Best Practices manual for cost and
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schedule management [Ref. 13]. This manual could be struc-
tured similar to the existing Department of the Navy Best
Practices manual used for reliability, maintainability, and
quality assurance. The manual should identify "traps" to
avoid in cost and schedule management, "alarms," or warning
signs of impending traps, and consequences which can result
from traps. It should also provide recommended "escapes" to
traps, and the benefits associated with these escapes.
The Best Practices manual should be organized into three
sections. The first section should include "traps" applicable
to all systems. The second set should include "traps"
applicable to major system acquisitions managed by the CPR.
The final section should specify "traps" unique to non-major
system acquisitions managed by the C/SSR.
Enormous benefits could be gained from this manual . It
would provide a valuable tool for all PMs, their staffs,
contracting officers, DCMAO/DPRO personnel, and other acquisi-
tion personnel on cost and schedule management issues . It
would be a particularly useful reference for inexperienced,
new personnel. Finally, this manual could incorporate cost
and schedule management "lessons learned" from throughout DoD,
providing an opportunity to prevent future, similar problems.
Another "lesson learned" from the A-12 termination is that
project managers emphasize aspects in project management that
they feel their boss is most concerned with, and those they
understand best
. Cost and schedule management is often not
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among these aspects. Therefore, if cost and schedule analysis
is not used routinely throughout the project management chain
of command, there is no guarantee that it will be used among
lower level project managers. Mr. Yockey has made it clear
throughout DoD that he is an advocate of earned value and its
use as a management tool. This sentiment has filtered down
through the chain of command in all three services, as
evidenced by memoranda advocating its use released by senior
executives in all three military services.
However, there is still a tendency for C/SSR-managed
projects to fall into the shadow behind major C/SCSC-managed
programs. As budgets decline, C/SSR-managed contracts will
likely increase in number. This situation will require
increased senior management attention and understanding of
C/SSR-managed projects.
Finally, the A-12's termination forced all three military
services and OSD to carefully review cost and schedule
management practices . These self-examinations have focused
primarily on major program management, but have positive
implications for non-major acquisitions. These reviews have
led to a heightened awareness of the importance of performance
management, various initiatives to improve cost and schedule
management, and a search for innovation for future project
management. The Air Force best exemplifies this innovation in
its ATF Program, previously discussed.
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All these actions suggest hope for continued improvement in
cost and schedule management throughout DoD. However, in
order for performance management to be effective, senior
managers must be prepared to terminate projects for cost and
schedule problems if justified. Too often, projects with
performance management problems are continued with futile
hopes of performance improvement. Some projects are continued
in spite of cost and schedule problems, with the hope of
obtaining needed technology. There is no guarantee that
continuation of these contracts will produce desired results.
Senior managers need to use cost and schedule trend analysis
to make these hard decisions about project continuation and
future funding. Trend analysis provides valuable insight to
project future project status, allowing senior managers to
make informed decisions on these issues.
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter examined how the Navy's A-12 Avenger Program
termination has affected the C/SSR environment. Particularly,
the chapter examined performance management initiatives taken
by all three military services and OSD since the A-12 termina-
tion. This chapter analyzed some of these initiatives and
discussed lessons learned. Finally, this chapter proposed




Chapter VI will analyze the December 1991 proposed C/SSR
Joint Guide. This analysis will examine how the guide should
be changed to retain adequate uniformity, while allowing
project managers flexibility to tailor requirements based on
contract size. This chapter will also analyze contractor
plant visits and their role in the C/SSR process. Finally,
Chapter VI will provide recommendations to improve cost and
schedule management on non-major DoD acquisitions.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED C/SSR JOINT GUIDE REVISION
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
OF COST AND SCHEDULE MANAGEMENT
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
This chapter will analyze the December 1991 proposed C/SSR
Joint Guide. This analysis will focus on how the guide should
be changed to retain adequate uniformity, while allowing the
non-major system project manager the flexibility to tailor
requirements based on contract size. Chapter VI also will
analyze contractor plant visits and their role in the C/SSR
process. Finally, this chapter will include recommendations
to improve future C/SSR management.
B. BACKGROUND /HI STORY OF THE C/SSR JOINT GUIDE REVISION
As a result of a strong recommendation from representatives
at the 1989 National Security and Industrial Association's
(NSIA) National Cost and Schedule Management Workshop, a joint
industry/DoD process action team (PAT) was formed to review
and update the C/SSR Joint Guide [Ref. 48] . Industry cost and
schedule management representatives felt that the 1978 guide
no longer provided adequate guidance to ensure uniform cost
and schedule management throughout DoD . Since 1978, it seemed
that each military service and/or command had developed varied
interpretations of the guide, leading to inconsistencies in
such areas as contractor plant visits, C/SSR implementation,
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and C/SSR surveillance. One contractor, in particular,
complained that each of his twenty Government contracts had a
different set of C/SSR requirements [Ref . 23] . These problems
contributed to confusion, frustration, and friction between
the Government and contractors
.
The PAT team's C/SSR Joint Guide draft was not completed
until February 1991. Changes in PAT leadership contributed to
the lengthy time it took to complete the draft . The process
action team sent its completed draft to the NSIA management
systems subcommittee and to the DoD Performance Measurement
Joint Executive Group (PMJEG) for comment and review [Ref.
48]. The PMJEG rejected this draft in September 1991.
The PMJEG rejected the process action team' s draft for
several reasons. First, since publication of the draft, the
Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) Council had drafted a new
DFARS clause regarding the C/SSR. The Federal Register
published this draft clause on 31 July 1991. The clause had
a proposed implementation date of 31 December 1991. The
clause (DFARS 252.242-7005) specified minimum requirements for
contractor management procedures and outlined specific
contractor responsibilities in the execution of C/SSR manage-
ment. Details of this clause were discussed in Chapter III,
"C/SSR Implementation." Since the process action team's draft
did not reference the new DFARS clause, or reflect its intent,
the PMJEG rejected the PAT draft [Ref. 13].
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The PMJEG rejected the PAT draft for several other reasons
as well. DoDI 5000.2, Defense Acquisition Management Policies
and Procedures, published on 23 February 1991, raised CPR
application thresholds to $60 million dollars for R&D con-
tracts and $250 million dollars for production contracts (in
1990 dollars) . This meant that C/SSR now had a wider applica-
tion within DoD. Members of the PMJEG felt that this thresh-
old application change merited a reexamination of C/SSR
guidance. Some members advocated exploring a "tiering"
approach to the C/SSR, with the application of more stringent
reporting requirements for larger C/SSR programs. [Ref. 13]
This "tiering" concept will be discussed and analyzed later in
this chapter.
Second, the PAT C/SSR Joint Guide draft contained a 65 item
comprehensive contractor plant visit checklist. This check-
list was included to provide Government personnel specific
guidance in the conduct of contractor plant visits. Members
felt that this "yes" or "no" checklist approach brought C/SSR
closer to resembling a CPR management system requirement [Ref.
13] . The original intent of the C/SSR was not to impose the
35 specific management system criteria of the CPR, in order to
maintain a flexible, and less extensive reporting system.
DoDI 5000.2 reaffirmed the C/SSR as a data item requirement,
as opposed to a management system requirement [Ref. 13] .
Contractors also strongly opposed the "yes" or "no" checklist
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approach because of the implied "pass /fail" management system
requirement [Ref. 32].
At the October 1991 NSIA National C/SCSC Workshop, the
issue of a new C/SSR Joint Guide again emerged as an area of
concern for workshop participants. Participants were frus-
trated with the slow progress toward an updated C/SSR Joint
Guide. The Air Force PMJEG representative volunteered to
assume responsibility for drafting a new guide. The Air Force
PMJEG published this draft on 11 December 1991 and distributed
it to industry and DoD representatives for review. Presently
,
the Air Force is awaiting final industry and DoD comments for
evaluation and incorporation into the guide.
It has been almost three years since the C/SSR Joint Guide
revision effort was initiated. As a result, the DoD is still
operating under an outdated 1978 guide. For example, the 1978
guide defines "non-major" contracts as "those to which the DoD
Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria are not required;
usually development contracts under $25 million or production
contracts under $100 million [Ref. 2:p. 1-1]." Both the
earlier DoDD 5000.1 published in 1987 and the most recent DoDI
5000.2 make this definition obsolete. Unfortunately, this
outdated guidance contributes to confusion in C/SSR implemen-
tation and execution.
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C. THE C/SSR "TIERING" CONCEPT
There is still debate as to how the C/SSR should be changed
to retain adequate uniformity in reporting requirements, while
allowing the project manager flexibility to tailor require-
ments based on contract size and complexity. Some advocate
the establishment of a "tiering" concept for non-major
projects. One version of this concept would involve the
establishment of two tiers. The lower tier would apply to
small, technically low-challenge projects. These projects
would implement the C/SSR without change. The plant visit
would consist of a "walk-through, talk-through" by the
contractor on the essential features in the cost and schedule
management system required to satisfy the contract. [Ref.
50:p. 2]
The upper tier would apply to larger, more complex,
technical non-major projects, which is admittedly vague.
These projects would implement a "reasonably rigorous"
management control system, or a scaled-down version of the
cost/schedule control systems criteria (C/SCSC) . The plant
visits would be more formal, similar to a Subsequent Applica-
tion Review used on major CPR managed contracts. 2
The upper tier C/SSR managed programs would also maintain
a management systems description, similar to major contracts.
2A Subsequent Application Review (SAR) is a visit by Govern-
ment personnel to a contractor's facility to determine whether the
contractor has properly applied the management control system which
had been previously accepted as meeting the requirements of C/SCSC,
to a new contract [Ref. 16:p. 520].
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[Ref . 50 :p. 2] A management system's description is a formal
written document of the contractor' s management data develop-
ment process, identifying such aspects as baseline develop-
ment
,
periodic control cycles (methods for reviewing the
plan's progress), and baseline changes [Ref. 52:p. 17].
Finally, upper tier contract cost and schedule reporting would
also include submission of format three of the CPR, baseline
reporting [Ref. 51:p. 16]. The baseline reporting format
records the net effect of monthly changes to the baseline at
the total contract level [Ref. 53:p. 4]. The "tiering
approach" concept makes intuitive sense by providing a more
rigorous and disciplined system to larger C/SSR managed
projects, while maintaining minimum standards for smaller
projects. In fact, the Australian Government is currently
contemplating the implementation of a two tiered C/SSR
approach for their Government administered contracts [Ref.
54 :p. 14] . However, the key problem in this approach is the
determination of application guidance. What threshold
guidance should be applied to categorize a project as an upper
tier versus a lower tier managed project?
The problem with establishing a threshold value based on a
dollar value is that it neglects consideration of a contract's
technical risk. For example, a $200 million production type
project could have less technical risk than a $125 million
production contract, depending on the technology involved. If
threshold guidance is specified based on contract risk or
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complexity, how does one quantify these factors sufficiently
to categorize the project into an upper tier or lower tier
managed program? It is the researcher' s opinion that the
entire tiered concept is not necessary to ensure good non-
major project cost and schedule management. The newly
established DFARS clause 252.242-7005 provides minimum
standards for contractor management systems appropriate for
all C/SSR type contracts. This clause emphasizes the most
important aspects critical to cost and schedule management,
including earned value, and the requirement for a contractor's
system to provide for the generation of timely and reliable
information for the C/SSR. Earned value (BCWP measurement) is
the key to ensuring that reliable information is provided by
the contractor regardless of contract size or complexity.
According to one experienced C/SSR expert, "Without an
accurate BCWP, the report loses much of its utility, cost and
schedule variances are not meaningful, trend analysis is
unrevealing, and the ability to assess the estimated final
cost is diminished" [Ref. 53:p. 3]. Project management
emphasis should be placed on earned value measurement and
satisfying DFARS clause 252.242-7005 provisions to ensure
effective cost and schedule management, rather than to the
application of varying degrees of system criteria and formal
written management system descriptions, as proposed by the
"tiering" concept.
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The "tiering" concept does propose one idea that the
researcher believes has merit for C/SSR managed projects. A
baseline report, similar to format three of the CPR would help
the project manager stay attuned to baseline adjustments.
Since significant changes to the baseline are an early
indication of contract problems, the addition of this format
would be valuable [Ref. 53 :p. 4]. Baseline changes also can
keep cost and schedule variances from emerging until it's too
late to do anything about them [Ref. 53:p. 4], The baseline
report would provide the PM the necessary visibility to
systematically track baseline changes. The baseline format
could be appropriately applied to all C/SSR projects, regard-
less of dollar value or complexity.
D. THE CONTRACTOR PLANT VISIT
As discussed in Chapter III, "C/SSR Implementation," C/SSR
managed contracts require the conduct of a contractor plant
visit. The plant visit familiarizes the PM and other Govern-
ment personnel with the contractor's internal management
practices including contractor methodology for determining
earned value . Based on many author interviews with both
Government and contractor cost and schedule management
personnel and PMs, it is the researcher's opinion that plant
visits should not be replaced by the formal and comprehensive
contractor internal management system validation requirement
currently imposed on larger, C/SCSC managed contracts. When
93
properly planned and executed by knowledgeable Government
representatives, the plant visit provides the non-major system
PM with sufficient understanding of the contractor's cost and
schedule management system to ensure effective project
management
.
Unfortunately, Government plant visits are not always
properly planned and conducted by trained Government represen-
tatives. These problems lead to over application of C/SSR
requirements, misunderstandings between Government and
contractor representatives, and contractor frustration. One
method proposed to create uniformity in plant visits is the
application of a plant visit checklist. As explained by one
Air Force representative from a command that conducts frequent
plant visits, "...contractors want to be treated fairly and
equally, so we have the need to make some sort of guide so
that our teams can apply the same sort of rigor from contrac-
tor to contractor, offset somewhat by the scope and dollar
amount of the contract" [Ref. 48].
It is the researcher's opinion that extensive checklists
are not the solution to plant visit problems. Detailed "yes
or no" checklists apply a criteria approach to C/SSR, similar
to system validation for major contract management. The C/SSR
was designed to be a flexible system, more appropriate for
smaller, less costly projects. As one DoD official stated,
"checklists are shortcuts to thinking [Ref. 13]." Contractor
interviews revealed that contractors also do not believe that
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the use of comprehensive checklists will improve plant visits
[Ref . 49]
.
The researcher does believe, however, that some guidance is
needed to create a structure and outline for plant visits.
This would be particularly helpful for less experienced
personnel. The researcher believes that the December 1991
proposed C/SSR Joint Guide contains appropriate guidance for
Government personnel. The proposed guidance takes the form of
an outline of important discussion topics for Government and
contractor representatives. Topics include such aspects as
developing performance data, subcontractor performance
measurement and reporting, direct/indirect cost application,
management reserve and undistributed budget uses/controls,
control of contract changes, constraints to preclude subjec-
tive adjustment of data, and cost/schedule variance analysis
[Ref. 15:pp. E-l through E-10]
.
The subsections of each topic include questions designed to
create a structure for the plant visit, instead of pass or
fail criteria. For example, under the topic of developing
performance data, one question states, "At what level are
actual costs being accumulated [Ref. 15 :p. E-4]?" This
approach provides structure, yet allows management flexibility
based on contract size, risk, and PM requirements. As stated
in the proposed guide, "Government representatives should use
the outline as a basis for asking questions or prompting
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discussions on those management practices which most affect
C/SSR reporting [Ref. 15 :p. E-l]."
Increased Government training efforts also will improve
plant visit planning and execution. Government team repre-
sentatives must thoroughly understand cost and schedule
management concepts in order to adequately investigate
contractor internal cost and schedule management systems
.
This training should be included as part of cost and schedule
management course curriculum. Commands also should develop
their new, less experienced personnel by pairing them with
more senior, trained personnel during plant visits. These
efforts will help to ensure that a contractor' s management
system is capable of generating timely and reliable informa-
tion for the C/SSR.
E. THE DRAFT C/SSR JOINT GUIDE OF 9 DECEMBER 1991
As stated previously in this chapter, the 9 December 1991
C/SSR Joint Guide draft is a second attempt to update the
antiquated 1978 guide. It is organized into four chapters:
general information, implementation actions, reports and their
use, and data element explanations. The draft guide also
contains six appendices that include helpful information such
as abbreviations, definitions, and a copy of the C/SSR report
with detailed completion instructions . The appendices also
contain guidance for the plant visit and a checklist to aid in
the review of the contractor's report. Although this 1991
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draft contains more detail than the 1978 guide, it is the
researcher's belief that this draft still does not adequately
target its audience. Based on the researcher's observations,
cost and schedule management training shortfalls exist
throughout DoD. Small project offices, with limited person-
nel, and technically-oriented project managers who are
engineers or scientists, are often deficient in cost and
schedule management knowledge and application. They may not
even view their job as business managers of the project. For
example, one major command did not even use the C/SSR as a
standard reporting format for applicable non-major contracts.
Instead, the command included its own "suggested" format as
part of contract RFPs. This example illustrates the need to
provide a sufficiently detailed C/SSR guide, targeted at
inexperienced personnel, including those in small project
offices
.
In particular, the 1991 draft guide should include more
detailed guidance on C/SSR analysis. The draft guide contains
only one paragraph of analysis guidance. Explanations on the
calculation and use of cost and schedule performance indices,
and the "to complete" performance index would be helpful for
the inexperienced analyst . The draft also states that the
"tracking of management reserve usage can be an important
problem indicator, " but does not suggest how to accomplish
this [Ref. 15 :p. 3-4]. The draft mentions that time history
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plots of the data can show important trends, but does not go
into the details of trend analysis [Ref. 15:p. 3-4].
The 1991 draft guide contains a complicated chart that
shows functional responsibilities of focal points within the
three military services and the Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA)
.
3 Unfortunately, focal points within the military
services are quite small. For example, the Navy's focal point
is only one person! These small focal points severely limit
cost and schedule management support available to project
offices. The guide does mention that delegation of focal
point responsibilities to subordinate organizational elements
or agencies will be by formal direction of the major command
[Ref. 15:p. 1-4]
.
It is the researcher's observation that the capabilities of
the focal point and the interaction between the focal point
and the project office vary greatly between commands. Thus,
conclusions in the draft guide indicating that, "the focal
point may be requested to provide advice in the C/SSR analy-
sis" and that "the PM should contact the field command focal
point for identification of a C/SSR team chief" might be
meaningless to project offices assigned to focal points with
limited staffing or assistance capability.
3A focal point is that major command responsible for facili-
tating the appropriate application and implementation of the C/SSR,
through policy and procedural guidance and assistance to the PM,
the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) , and the Contract Adminis-
tration Officer (CAO) [Ref. 15:p. 1-4].
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Perhaps, the guide cannot correct what could be interpreted
as a military service problem. For the focal points to be
useful, they need to be staffed with sufficient trained
personnel (based on the number of contracts per command)
.
Their functions, capabilities, and interaction with the
project offices also need to be clearly defined and standard-
ized before publication in the C/SSR Guide. It would be
helpful if focal points could provide C/SSR assistance teams
to the project offices as required. The researcher does not
believe, however, that the guide should develop into a
detailed "cookbook" type approach to the C/SSR because it is
important to retain management flexibility in the C/SSR.
There is no substitute for management "thinking." The project
manager should be able to use good management judgment to
tailor C/SSR requirements to his particular project based on
his contract risk analysis and management needs. For example,
if a contract is 75 percent complete and is meeting cost and
schedule targets and will not be modified, what's wrong with
a PM suggesting to the contractor that report submission be
reduced to bimonthly, or prepared only to WBS level one or two
[Ref. 13]?
This type of management understanding, however, can only be
attained through effective performance management training and
education. Project managers and their staffs must understand
report information, report analysis, and the report's use in
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project management. To accomplish this, a PM must be actively
involved in cost and schedule management on a routine basis.
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter provided the history and background of the
C/SSR Joint Guide revision efforts to date. It also provided
an analysis of the C/SSR "tiering" concept and contractor
plant visits. Chapter VI also provided an analysis of the
1991 C/SSR Joint Guide draft. In addition, the researcher
provided recommendations for the improvement of DoD C/SSR
management
.
Chapter VII will contain a thesis summary, conclusions, and
answers to the research questions. The chapter will also
contain recommendations and will propose areas for further
non-major system cost and schedule management research.
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS,
AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A. SUMMARY
Although major defense acquisition programs often over-
shadow non-major programs, non-major acquisitions share
similar cost and schedule concerns . As DoD budgets continue
their decline, the majority of CPR managed contracts will
likely become C/SSR managed contracts. This situation will
require increased senior management attention and understand-
ing of the C/SSR management system.
This thesis provided the non-major system project manager
with the necessary perspective to help implement and manage
non-major project costs and schedules effectively. First,
Chapter II provided the reader with a historical perspective
of cost and schedule management in DoD and an understanding of
the development of the current Cost/Schedule Status Report.
It also familiarized the reader with report objectives, key
aspects of the C/SSR, and the role of DCAA, DCMAO, and the ACO
in non-major system cost and schedule management
.
Chapter III described management actions that should be
taken during the non-major contract preaward process to ensure
adequate initial cost and schedule management and valid C/SSR
information. Management decisions made during the preaward
process impact the manner, frequency, and level of cost and
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schedule data reporting during contract execution. This
chapter also discussed the establishment of the performance
measurement baseline and contractor measurement of earned
value, two key aspects to effective cost and schedule manage-
ment .
Chapter IV discussed Cost/Schedule Report analysis and
management actions the PM can take if a contract is over cost
and behind schedule. This chapter also provided the PM an
introduction to graphical trend analysis of data. Graphical
analysis provides the PM an excellent quantitative visual tool
to evaluate cost and schedule management trends. A familiar-
ization with the capabilities of Performance Analyzer software
also provides the PM with an understanding of the software's
application to performance management. In addition, the
chapter discussed over target baseline management.
Chapter V discussed and analyzed the affect that the Navy
A-12 Aircraft Program termination has had on the C/SSR
environment. This chapter included a review of recent OSD and
military service initiatives taken to improve cost and
schedule management. It also detailed "lessons learned" from
the A-12 termination and provided recommendations for future
cost and schedule improvement initiatives.
Chapter VI provided an examination of the proposed C/SSR
Joint Guide revision including a discussion of a previous
revision attempt. This chapter familiarized the reader with
the C/SSR "tiering" concept and discussed its potential impact
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on C/SSR reporting. It also provided a discussion on the
C/SSR contractor plant visit and the researcher' s recommenda-
tions to improve it. Finally, Chapter VI provided the
researcher's recommendations for improving the C/SSR Joint
Guide draft
.
B. ANSWERS AND FINDINGS TO THESIS QUESTIONS
The following are answers to the research questions posed
in Chapter I. Where applicable, reference is made to the
chapters where a more in-depth discussion can be found.
What should the project manager know to achieve cost and
schedule control in non-major Department of Defense acquisi-
tions and what affect has the Cost/Schedule Status Report had
on cost and schedule performance?
This thesis focused on many aspects that the non-major
system project manager needs to know to achieve effectiveness
of project cost and schedule control. First, the PM must
clearly understand the objectives of the C/SSR. The C/SSR
provides the Government project manager with summary level
cost/schedule performance status for early identification of
the magnitude and impact of problems having significant cost
variances . It also provides the PM objective and quantifiable
contract cost and schedule status information for use in
decision-making. Finally, it quantifies the effects of
management actions taken to resolve existing problems
.
Chapter II, Section B, discussed C/SSR objectives in detail.
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Secondly, the PM should understand the mechanics of the
report itself. The PM should be familiar with the four parts
of the report: contract report administrative information,
contract data, performance data, and narrative explanations.
Chapter II, Section C, discussed the mechanics of the C/SSR in
detail
.
Third, the non-major system PM should understand the
differences between the Cost/Schedule Status Report and the
Cost Performance Report. Chapter II, Section D discussed
these differences. These differences allow the C/SSR to be a
flexible, less demanding requirement, more appropriate to
smaller projects. The PM should know when the C/SSR should be
applied to a project versus the more extensive CPR. Chapter
II, Section A provided the thresholds for CPR versus C/SSR
application
.
Fourth, the non-major system PM should understand how to
effectively implement cost and schedule management into his
project, including how to utilize DCAA, DCMAO, and ACO
personnel to assist in this effort. The researcher found that
these assets are often underutilized by PMs . Since these
agencies are often located close to the contractor plant, they
can provide the PM with timely, first-hand, on-site investiga-
tion of contractor cost and schedule management. DCAA, DCMAO,
and ACO responsibilities in cost and schedule management were
discussed in Chapter II, Section E. DCMAO surveillance
responsibilities should be detailed in a Memorandum of
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Agreement between the PM and DCMAO Program and Technical
Support personnel assigned as matrix support. Chapter III,
Section J, discussed the Memorandum of Agreement in detail.
The PM needs to understand the importance of proactive PM
involvement during the contract preaward process. The
researcher found that the preaward phase of C/SSR implementa-
tion is key to project cost and schedule management. Manage-
ment decisions made during this phase impact the manner,
frequency, and level of cost and schedule data reporting
during contract execution. Actions that impact project cost
and schedule management included during the preaward phase are
the development of the contract statement of work, contract
work breakdown structure and variance thresholds . Chapter
III, Sections B, C, and D discussed these aspects in detail.
The PM also needs to understand initial contractor actions
that affect project cost and schedule management. This
includes the establishment of the performance measurement
baseline, against which project performance is measured.
Also, once the baseline is established, it is equally impor-
tant to maintain its integrity in order to generate accurate
cost and schedule information. Baseline changes should be
managed and controlled by the contractor. Chapter III,
Sections G, discussed the development and maintenance of the
performance measurement baseline in detail.
Fifth, the PM needs to understand the purpose of the
contractor plant visit. This visit provides the project
105
manager and his staff with a basic understanding of the
methods by which the contractor plans the work, controls
project resources, evaluates project accomplishment, measures
cost/schedule performance, collects costs, and incorporates
contract changes into the baseline. Most importantly, the
plant visit provides the opportunity for Government represen-
tatives to gain an understanding of the contractor's methodol-
ogy for measuring earned value. Chapter III, Sections H and
I addressed these subjects in detail.
Since the contractor plant visit provides the PM valuable
contractor cost and schedule management information, it is
important that Government team representatives be well trained
in plant visit execution. The researcher found that this is
often not the case, resulting in overapplication of C/SSR
requirements, misunderstandings between Government and
contractor representatives, and contractor frustration.
Chapter VI, Section D, discussed this issue and proposed
solutions to this problem.
Sixth, the PM needs to understand how the C/SSR is analyzed
and how analysis can be used for project cost and schedule
management. Chapter IV, Sections B, C, D, E, and F provided
performance factors, indices, and other analytical techniques
and performance indicators helpful in C/SSR analysis. The PM
should understand how to use graphical, trend analysis and
Performance Management software as tools to evaluate project
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cost and schedule management. Chapter IV, Sections E and F,
discussed these aspects in detail.
The researcher discovered that PMs and their staffs are
often weak in this aspect of C/SSR management. It is impor-
tant for cost and schedule managers to understand the meaning
of the various performance factors and indices, in addition to
understanding their calculation. Education and training
shortfalls throughout DoD have contributed to this problem.
Chapter V adressed training shortfalls and on-going initia-
tives to correct this problem.
The PM also needs to be familiar with various management
actions available for use when cost and schedule problems
arise. The PM needs to ensure that he clearly understands the
nature of the problem and that he is satisfied with explana-
tions provided by the contractor for all variances exceeding
thresholds . The PM should also understand the advantages and
disadvantages of withholding contractor progress payments.
Chapter IV, Section G, discussed management aspects available
to the PM in detail.
Seventh, the PM needs to understand the affect that
reprogramming and replanning have on cost and schedule
management . Both reprogramming and replanning affect the
performance measurement baseline and must be carefully managed
to prevent distortions in cost and schedule management
reporting. Chapter III, Section G, discussed replanning while
Chapter IV, Section H, discussed reprogramming.
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Eighth, the PM needs to understand how the A-12's termina-
tion has affected DoD cost and schedule management. Initia-
tives taken by the three military services and DoD have
implications for non-major program management. Specifically,
how OSD and service-initiated training reforms will provide an
opportunity to improve cost and schedule management education
for all programs. Also, a heightened management interest in
performance analysis by Mr. Yockey is likely to result in
increased management attention toward cost and schedule
management in all DoD programs. Chapter V discussed these
initiatives and their implications for non-major cost and
schedule management
.
Finally, the non-major system PM should have an understand-
ing of on-going efforts to revise the C/SSR Joint Guide. The
PM needs to understand the implications of proposed changes to
non-major system project management. Chapter VI discussed
these aspects in detail and provided suggestions to improve
non-major cost and schedule management
.
Overall, the Cost /Schedule Status Report has had a positive
influence on cost and schedule management within the Depart-
ment of Defense. When used properly by trained personnel, it
provides the non-major system project manager with an excel-
lent project management tool. Unfortunately, it is sometimes
viewed by PMs as only a "required report" versus a management
tool. This attitude prevents the PM from fully realizing the
value of the report in project management. To fully integrate
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earned value into project management , the PM must incorporate
report information into management decision making. This
requires the PM to actively question contractor narratives,
report analysis, and contractor corrective actions.
Unfortunately, PMs and staffs within non-major programs are
often inexperienced and not well-trained in cost and schedule
management. Some engineers and scientists assigned as project
managers do not even view cost and schedule management as part
of their duty. These attitudes need to be overcome in order
for the C/SSR to fully be utilized as an effective performance
management tool
.
What are the key aspects of the Cost/Schedule Status Report
(C/SSR)
?
The C/SSR consists of four parts: contractor report
administrative information, contract data, performance data,
and narrative explanations . The short administrative section
includes information on the contract type, project name,
contractor name and location, report period, and signature of
the contractor' s authorized representative who prepared the
report
.
The contract data section establishes the overall contract
values. This value serves as a cost baseline for the purposes
of cost performance measurement. The C/SSR performance data
section depicts contract cost status for the specified cost
work breakdown structure elements on a cumulative basis and as
estimated at completion.
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Narrative explanations are included as a separate portion
of the C/SSR when work breakdown structure variances exceed
established thresholds. Chapter II, Section C provided a
detailed explanation of all items contained in the C/SSR.
How does non-major acquisition cost/schedule management
differ from major system acquisition cost/schedule management?
How is it similar?
Non-major acquisition cost and schedule management has more
flexible, less demanding, and less costly reporting require-
ments than major acquisition cost and schedule management.
Non-major acquisitions that require cost and schedule report-
ing (as specified in DoDI 5000.2, Defense Acquisition Manage-
ment Policies and Procedures) use the abbreviated two format
Cost/Schedule Status Report (C/SSR) . Major acquisitions that
require cost and schedule reporting use the five format Cost
Performance Report (CPR) . The C/SSR contains a format similar
to format one of the CPR, but contains only cumulative data,
vice current period data required by the CPR. The C/SSR also
does not require the functional performance reporting,
manloading projections, and baseline reporting required by the
CPR. Both reports contain a contractor narrative explaining
overall contract performance and significant variance (s)
explanation
.
The CPR also requires the budgeted cost of work scheduled
(BCWS) and budgeted cost of work performed (BCWP) to be
calculated as a direct summation of work package budgets. The
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C/SSR is more flexible and permits the determination of these
values through any reasonably accurate, consistent, and
mutually agreed to means.
Finally, the C/SSR does not require a formal Government
validation of a contractor's internal cost and schedule
management system. Instead, it only requires a contractor
plant visit by Government representatives to familiarize
project management personnel with the contractor's internal
management systems. Both systems, however, require the
contractor to use consistent and objective measures for
collecting and reporting cost and schedule information.
Chapter II, Section D, discussed this section in detail.
How does the project manager use the data provided in the
Cost/Schedule Status Report?
The C/SSR provides the Government project manager with
objective contractor performance status for early identifica-
tion of cost and schedule problems. Report analysis allows
the PM to make management decisions and to take timely
corrective action to improve contractor performance. Report
trend analysis allows the project manager to evaluate the
effects of corrective actions by indicating whether cost and
schedule variances are improving or getting worse. Trend
analysis also provides the PM with a forecast of the estimated
cost of the project at completion. Chapter IV provided the
reader with information on how to conduct C/SSR analysis and
trend analysis. It also described appropriate management
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actions the PM can take if a project is over cost or behind
schedule
.
How does the Government set an appropriate threshold to
measure cost/schedule variance?
There are several approaches that can be used by the PM to
determine appropriate variance thresholds. In all cases, the
project manager should consider the contract's size and risk
when choosing a threshold percentage and a dollar minimum.
The PM also should include in the contract request for
proposal a requirement for periodic variance threshold
reviews, enabling the PM to adjust thresholds based on
management information needs.
Often thresholds are established based on a certain
percentage of BCWP or BCWS and/or an established dollar
minimum. Any cost and schedule variance that exceeds the
threshold would require contractor variance analysis and
narrative explanation.
One simple approach sometimes used in setting thresholds is
for the PM to establish a fixed number of variances for the
contractor to report. This approach ensures the project
manager is receiving a manageable amount of contractor
narrative explanations, while ensuring visibility over the
most important project problems.
Another approach is for the PM to specify narrative
reporting for only critical items that exceed thresholds.
Risk analysis determines the critical cost and schedule
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drivers . One variation to this approach is to set lower
thresholds on critical items and higher thresholds for less
critical items. Chapter III, Section D, discussed this topic
in detail
.
Since C/SSR does not require the evaluation or acceptance
of a contractor's internal management procedures, what
problems does this create?
When properly planned and conducted by trained Government
representatives, the plant visit provides the non-major system
PM with sufficient understanding of the contractor's cost and
schedule management system to ensure effective project
management. The problem is that Government representatives
are not always well-trained in the conduct of plant visits.
This problem leads to over application of C/SSR requirements,
misunderstandings between Government and contractor represen-
tatives, and contractor frustration. The researcher believes
that the December 1991 proposed C/SSR Joint Guide contains
appropriate guidance to structure contractor plant visits and
assist Government representatives. Chapter VI, Section D,
discussed this subject in detail.
What is meant by rebaselining and what effect does it have
on the C/SSR?
Rebaselining refers to contractor replanning or reprogram-
ming actions . Replanning is a change in the original baseline
for accomplishing authorized contractual requirements . The
contractor can replan work as long as he stays within the
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contract target cost or estimated cost, and completes all work
by the contractual completion date. Without a tight disci-
pline of changes, any established baseline will be lost,
creating problems in accurate cost and schedule management
reporting. Chapter III, Section G, discussed contractor
replanning in detail.
Reprogramming, or an over target baseline is when a
contractor requests approval to manage to a goal above the
contract target cost . It results in the contractor' s total
allocated budget exceeding his contract budget base, and
results in a major restructuring of contractor efforts.
Reprogramming is a formal declaration of a contract overrun by
the contractor
.
Reprogramming results in major changes to the baseline. It
also results in the resetting of cost and schedule variances
to zero. Essentially, the C/SSR is "restarted" to represent
the new over target baseline management . The PM can retain
visibility of old problems through the contractor' s submission
of a latest revised estimate with his C/SSR, through the
development of a ratio between the total allocated budget
before reprogramming and the total allocated budget after
reprogramming, or by requiring contractor reprogramming
adjustment reporting. Chapter IV, Section H, discussed these
aspects of reprogramming in detail
.
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How should the C/SSR be changed to retain adequate unifor-
mity in reporting requirements while allowing the project
manager flexibility to tailor requirements based on contract
size and complexity?
The C/SSR should include baseline reporting, similar to
format three of the CPR. This would help the project manager
stay attuned to baseline adjustments. The C/SSR Joint Guide
also should contain additional detail and guidance, particu-
larly on C/SSR analysis, to assist inexperienced cost and
schedule managers. In addition, DoD/military department focal
point responsibilities and staffing requirements should be
reassessed by the OSD staff and the military services . Their
functions, capabilities, and interaction with the project
offices also need to be clearly defined and standardized prior
to their publication in the C/SSR Guide.
The researcher does not believe that the C/SSR Guide should
take a detailed "cookbook" type approach. A "cookbook" type
approach would reduce management flexibility and discourage
individual "thinking." The researcher believes, however, that
management flexibility and "thinking" can only be attained
through effective performance management education offered
through DSMC and AFIT, including an understanding of report
information, report analysis, and the report's use in project
management. This topic was discussed in detail in Chapter VI,
Section E.
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How has the Navy's A-12 program cancellation affected the
C/SSR environment? Are there any applicable lessons learned?
The Navy's A-12 program cancellation has led to a height-
ened OSD interest in cost and schedule management and a number
of actions throughout DoD to strengthen cost and schedule
control practices . Although there have been no specific
actions directed solely at non-major projects, there have been
many reforms initiated by all three military services and OSD,
that have affected the entire cost and schedule control
community, including non-major acquisitions.
Mr. Yockey's personal interest in promoting the use of
earned value in DoD project management has resulted in a
renewed interest in its use throughout the DoD acquisition
community. He has emphasized the need for increased manage-
ment training and has created a new billet within the Office
of Acquisition Policy, Program Integration and Cost Management
to improve cost and schedule management education. Training
review efforts have contributed to the publication of three
key Department of Defense publications as discussed in Chapter
V, Section B. A detailed OSD-led review of DoD acquisition
training and education at DSMC and AFIT has also revealed
shortfalls in earned value education, including course funding
and course content. Actions to improve these shortfalls are
currently being addressed at the OSD level. In addition, Mr.
Yockey's interest in cost and schedule analysis has resulted
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in the formation of a Tri-Service and DLA panel for Perfor-
mance Analyzer software
.
Navy initiatives since the A-12 termination have focused on
the development of a Revitalization Plan to improve Navy cost
and schedule management . The Cost Performance Analysis
Working Group chartered to develop this plan identified
twenty-two recommendations to strengthen performance manage-
ment. Chapter V, Section C, discussed these recommendations
which are currently awaiting final review and approval by the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (RD&A) . Various Naval System
Commands have also initiated actions to improve cost and
schedule management education as discussed in Chapter V,
Section C. As recommended by the researcher, these Navy-
initiated courses should be assimilated as part of the Defense
Acquisition University structure.
Army initiatives since the A-12 termination have focused on
a study of current Army performance management practices
.
This study resulted in the approval, by the Army Acquisition
Executive, of three recommendations to improve performance
management practices within the Army. Chapter V, Section D
discussed these recommendations. Mr. Conver, the Army
Aquisition Executive, also expressed his concern about cost
and schedule management in both the September-October 19 91 and
November-December 1991 issues of the Army Research, Develop-
ment, & Acquisition Bulletin.
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Air Force initiatives have focused on experimenting with
acquisition innovations, specifically within its F-22,
Advanced Tactical Fighter Aircraft Program. Chapter V,
Section E discussed these initiatives. Lessons learned on
this program are likely to result in future initiatives
benefiting all projects. The Air Force Systems Command has
also taken several initiatives to promote performance manage-
ment as discussed in Chapter V, Section E.
Chapter V, Section E, discussed "lessons learned" from the
A-12 termination. The "lessons learned" included a recogni-
tion of the lack of coordinated cost and schedule management
training effort throughout DoD . A coordinated OSD-led focus
is currently in progress to correct this deficiency.
Another A-12 termination "lesson learned" found by the
researcher is that a project manager emphasizes aspects that
he feels his boss is most concerned with, or that the PM is
most "comfortable" with. Cost and schedule management is
often not one of these aspects, particularly in small pro-
jects. If cost and schedule analysis is not routinely used
throughout the larger program management chain of command,
there is no guarantee that it will be used among lower level
project managers. For performance management to be effective,
senior managers must understand its principles and make the
right "informed" decision, including terminating projects for
cost and schedule management problems, when justified.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS
DoD should require the contractor to submit a baseline
report as part of the contractor's monthly C/SSR.
A baseline report, similar to format three of the CPR,
would help the project manager stay attuned to baseline
adjustments . Since significant baseline changes are often an
early indication of contract problems, the addition of this
format would be extremely helpful . This format could be
appropriately applied to all C/SSR projects, regardless of
dollar value or complexity.
The proposed December 1991 C/SSR Joint Guide should be
revised toward providing adequate cost and schedule management
guidance for inexperienced personnel .
Since performance management education shortfalls exist
throughout DoD, the guide should be tailored toward providing
the necessary cost and schedule management guidance for
inexperienced personnel. Specifically, the guide should
contain more detail on C/SSR analysis. However, the research-
er believes that the proposed guide contains appropriate
guidance to structure and improve contractor plant visits.
Focal point staffing within the military services should be
increased to provide the capability to provide assistance to
non-major system project offices in the areas of C/SSR
implementation, plant visits, and C/SSR analysis.
Focal points within the many commands and services are
insufficiently staffed to provide any comprehensive assistance
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to non-major system project offices. Also, their functions,
capabilities, and interaction with the project offices are
often ill-defined and vary greatly between commands and
services. For the focal points to be useful, they need to be
staffed with sufficiently trained personnel i.e., based on the
number of contracts per command or number of projects. The
focal points should be capable of providing C/SSR expertise to
the non-major system PM, as required. This would provide a
strong service and central point of contact for C/SSR issues
and problems within the various military commands
.
DoD should develop and publish a DoD Best Practices Manual
for cost and schedule management .
This manual would provide a valuable tool for all PMs,
their staffs, contracting officers, DCMAO/DPRO personnel, and
other acquisition personnel, on cost and schedule management
issues. It would be particularly useful for inexperienced
personnel . This manual could incorporate cost and schedule
management "lessons learned" from throughout DoD, providing an
opportunity to prevent future, similar problems.
The manual could be structured similar to the existing Navy
Best Practices Manual used for reliability, maintainability,
and quality assurance. The manual should identify "traps" to
avoid in cost and schedule management, "alarms" or warning
signs of impending traps, and consequences that can result
from the traps. It also should provide recommended "escapes"
from traps, and the benefits associated with these escapes.
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Training innovations need to be explored and implemented
throughout DoD .
Declining military budgets will demand training innovation.
One approach is a requirement for students to complete a basic
cost and schedule control familiarization correspondence
course as a prerequisite to attendance at a formal DoD
performance management school . This would allow resident
classtime to focus on more complex or detailed aspects of cost
and schedule management, while ensuring a foundation of
knowledge for all students. Video and satellite technology
should also be used in cost and schedule management education.
The use of this technology would allow more students to
participate in training, while reducing expensive travel
costs
.
DoD also should implement periodic on-site assistance
seminars at major service acquisition commands. These
seminars could be taught by a cadre of experienced performance
management instructors from AFIT, DSMC, former PMs, or other
cost and schedule control experts, or contracted out to
civilian cost and schedule management consultants. Consider-
ation also should be given to allowing contractor PMs and
their staffs to attend the training. This would further cost
and schedule management communication and understanding
between the Government and the contractor, providing the
potential for improved reporting and earned value management.
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In all approaches , training efforts should include the
education of engineers and scientists assigned non-major
project management responsibility. Often, these personnel do
not receive any formal performance management training. As
one result of this lack of training, many engineers and
scientists assigned as non-major acquisition project managers
view their responsibilities in terms of meeting technical
requirements and not in terms of managing cost and schedule.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Further research should focus on a detailed examination of
C/SSR application within a particular Army subordinate command
such as the Aviation Systems Command or Communications and
Electronics Systems Command. This narrower focus would allow
the researcher to explore C/SSR implementation and application
in depth. This research would provide these commands with an
independent assessment of their C/SSR management. This
assessment could be used by the commands to improve cost and
schedule management within their non-major system acquisi-
tions .
Another area for further research would be an investiga-
tion of the potential for earned value application and C/SSR
use within Government activities including depots, proving
grounds, and laboratories [Ref. 55]. These agencies often
have contractual relationships with project offices, providing
them with Government furnished equipment, research studies,
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etc. Often, these contracts fall within a dollar range
applicable for C/SSR management. Unfortunately, however,
cost/schedule status reporting is not currently required
between Government agencies. As a result, project managers
are only provided cost estimates and cost actuals for depot,
lab, or proving ground work, and have no method to determine
earned value during work execution. Since earned value is a
good management tool and is required of contractors, it would
make sense to implement it within these Government activities
.
This research also should include a survey of depots,
proving grounds and laboratories to determine personnel
knowledge and use of earned value . The research should
determine how these activities presently estimate and manage
cost and schedule performance. Finally, the research should
provide a recommendation as to whether it is feasible to
implement the C/SSR within depots, proving grounds, and
laboratories. If earned value application is feasible, the
researcher should also provide recommendations on how, and to





Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP) - The cumulative actual
costs (direct and indirect) of work accomplished as of the
reporting cut-off date listed by each work breakdown structure
element [Ref. 56:p. B-3]
.
At Completion-Budgeted- The total budget identified to each
work breakdown structure element (including any contract
changes, application of management reserve, or internal
replanning [Ref. 2:p. E—3]
.
At Completion-Variance- The difference between the Budgeted
Cost at Completion and the Latest Revised Estimate [Ref. 2:p.
E-3] .
Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) - The sum of the budgets
for completed work packages and completed portions of open
work packages, plus the appropriate portion of the budgets for
level of effort and apportioned effort . Also known as earned
value [Ref. 16:p. 504].
Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS) - The sum of the budgets
for all work scheduled to be accomplished within a given time
period [Ref. 16:p. 504].
Buy-in- Submission of an offer by a contractor, usually
substantially below estimated cost, with the expectation of
winning the contract [Ref. 56 :p. B-13]
.
Contract Budget Base- The sum of the current target cost and
the estimate of authorized, unpriced work [Ref. 56:p. B-19]
.
Contract Data Reguirements List (CDRL) - A listing of data
requirements specified for a contract [Ref. 56:p. 505].
Contract Target Cost - The negotiated estimated cost excluding
profit or fee [Ref. 16:p. 505].
Contract Target Price - The negotiated estimated cost including
profit or fee [Ref. 16:p. 505].
Cost Account - An identified management control point at which
actual costs can be accumulated and compared to budgeted cost
for work performed. It represents the work assigned to one
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responsible organizational element on the contract work
breakdown structure [Ref. 16 :p. 505].
Cost Performance Report - A Department of Defense management
report generated by the contractor and utilized by a project
manager to manage cost and schedule status on major (or
significant) contracts [Ref. 16:p. 507].
Cost/Schedule Status Report (C/SSR) - A Department of Defense
management report generated by the contractor and utilized by
a project manager to manage cost and schedule status on non-
major contracts [Ref. 16:p. 507].
Cost Variance (CV) - The difference between the Budgeted Cost
of Work Performed and the Actual Cost of Work Performed.
[Ref. 2:p. E-3]
.
Estimate at Completion (EAC) - Actual direct and applied
indirect costs of a contract to date, plus the estimate of
costs for authorized work remaining [Ref. 16:p. 509].
Focal Point - Major command responsible for facilitating the
appropriate application and implementation of the C/SSR,
through policy and procedural guidance and assistance to the
PM, procuring contracting officer, and the administrative
contracting officer [Ref. 15:p. 1-4].
General and Administrative (G & A) - Indirect costs incurred in
the general management of the company, not related to product
output [Ref. 16:p.511].
Latest Revised Estimate (LRE) - The total dollar value of work
to date plus the contractor's estimate of the cost for work
remaining listed by work breakdown structure element. [Ref.
2:p. E-3]
.
Management Reserve- The portion of the contract budget base
that is held for management control purposes by the contractor
to cover the expense of unanticipated program requirements
[Ref .2:p. E-4]
.
Non-major contract- A research, development, test, or develop-
ment, test, or evaluation contract with a value of less than
$60 million, or a procurement contract with a value of less
than $250 million (in fiscal year 1990 constant dollars) . Also
referred to as a less than significant contract [Ref. 6:p. 11-
B-2] .
Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB) - The time phased budget
plan developed by the contractor against which project
performance is measured [Ref. 16:p. 515].
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Progress Payments - Payments made to a prime contractor,
normally on a fixed-price type contract, on the basis of a
percentage of his incurred costs [Ref. 16:p. 517].
Preprogramming- The baseline rebudgeting activity which occurs
when the contractor formally notifies the PM that the Total
Allocated Budget must exceed the Contract Budget Base.
Essentially, it is a recognition by the contractor of a
contract overrun [Ref.22:p. 15].
Request for Proposal (RFP) - A soliciatation document used to
request proposals from potential contractors [Ref. 56 :p. B-
95] .
Subseguent Application Review (SAR) - Visit by Government
personnel to a contractor' s facility to determine whether the
contractor has properly applied the management control system
previously accepted as meeting the requirements of C/SCSC to
a new contract [Ref. 16:p. 520].
Schedule Variance (SV) - The difference between the Budgeted
Cost for Work Scheduled and the Budgeted Cost for Work
Performed [Ref. 16:p. 519].
Statement of Work- That portion of a contract which
establishes and defines all non-specification requirements,
either directly or by cited documents [Ref. 56:p. B-105]
.
Thresholds- Monetary or time reference points determined by
the government project manager to track contract progress,
which if breached, require analysis by the contractor. [Ref.
16:p. 521]
.
Undistributed Budget - The amount of budget applicable to the
contract which has not been identified to work breakdown
structure elements at or below the reporting level [Rf . 16 :p.
521] .
Work Breakdown Structure- A family tree division of hardware,
software, services, and project tasks which organizes,
defines, and graphically displays the product to be produced,
as well as the work to be accomplished to achieve the
specified product. Also called the contract work breakdown
structure [Ref. 16p: 522].
Work Packages - Detailed short span jobs, or material items
which have assigned budgets for accomplishing the work





AAE- Army Acquisition Executive [Ref. 56:p. A-l].
ACAT- Acquisition Category [Ref. 56:p. A-l].
ACQ- Administrative Contracting Officer [Ref. 56:p. A-l].
ACWP - Actual Cost of Work Performed [Ref. 56:p. A-l].
AFIT- Air Force Institute of Technology [Ref. 56:p. A-l].
ASN (RD&A) - Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research,
Development, and Acquisition [Ref. 56:p. A-2]
.
BAC- Budget at Completion [Ref. 56:p. A-3]
.
BCWP- Budgeted Cost of Work Performed [Ref. 56:p. A-3].
BCWS - Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled [Ref. 5 6 :p. A-3].
CAP- Contract Administration Office [Ref. 56:p.A-3].
CBB- Contract Budget Base [Ref. 16:p. 505].
CDRL- Contract Data Requirements List [Ref. 16 :p. 505]
.
CEO- Chief Executive Officer [Ref. 56:p. A-4]
.
CPAWG- Cost Performance Analysis Working Group [Ref. 40 :p. 4]
CPI - Cost Performance Index [Ref. 16:p. 507].
CWBS - Contract Work Breakdown Structure [Ref. 16:p. 507].
CPR- Cost Performance Report [Ref. 16:p. 507].
C/SCSC- Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria [Ref. 16 :p.
507] .
C/SSR- Cost/Schedule Status Report [Ref. 16:p. 507].
CV- Cost Variance [Ref. 16:p. 507].
DCAA- Defense Contract Audit Agency [Ref. 56:p. A-5]
.
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DCMAO- Defense Contract Management Area Operations [Ref . 56 :p.
A-5] .
DCMC- Defense Contract Management Command [Ref. 56:p. A-5].
DFARS- Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement [Ref.
56 :p. A-6]
.
DLA- Defense Logistics Agency [Ref. 56:p. A-6].
DPRO- Defense Plant Representative Office [Ref. 56:p. A-6].
DSMC- Defense Systems Management College [Ref. 56:p. A-6].
DTIC- Defense Technical Information Center [Ref. 56:p. A-7 ]
.
EAC- Estimate at Completion [Ref. 56:p. A-7].
ETC- Estimate to Completion [Ref. 16:p. 509].
FAR- Federal Acquisition Regulation [Ref. 56:p. A-7].
G&A- General and Administrative [Ref. 16:p. 511]
.
GFE- Government Furnished Equipment [Ref. 56 :p. A-8]
.
LRE- Latest Revised Estimate [Ref. 56:p. A-ll].
MOA- Memorandum of Agreement [Ref. 56 :p. A-ll]
.
NAVAIR- Naval Air Systems Command [Ref. 56:p. A-12],
NAVSEA- Naval Sea Systems Command [Ref. 56:p. A-12].
OSD- Office of the Secretary of Defense [Ref. 56:p. A-14],
OTB- Over Target Baseline [Ref. 16:p. 515].
PA- Performance Analyzer [Ref. 29 :p. 1]
.
PAT- Process Action Team [Ref. 48].
PEO- Program Executive Officer [Ref. 56:p. A-14].
PERT- Program Evaluation and Review Technique [Ref. 56 :p. A-
14] .
PMB- Performance Measurement Baseline [Ref. 16:p. 516].
PM- Project or Program Manager [Ref. 56 :p. 516]
.
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R&D- Research and Development [Ref. 56 :p. A-16]
.
RFP - Request for Proposal [Ref. 56:p. A-16].
SARDA- Assistant Secretary of the Army, Research,
Development, and Acquisition [Ref. 42].
SPI - Schedule Performance Index [Ref. 16:p. 261].
SV- Schedule Variance [Ref. 16:p. 520].
SOW- Statement of Work [Ref. 56 :p. A-17]
.
SYSCOMS - Systems Commands [Ref. 56:p. A-18].
TAB- Total Allocated Budget [Ref. 16:p. 520].
TCP
I
- To Complete Performance Index [Ref. 16:p. 521].
TQM- Total Quality Management [Ref. 56:p. A-19]
.
USD (A) - Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) [Ref. 56 :p
A-19]
.
VAC- Variance at Completion [Ref. 16:p. 521].









EAC- Estimate at Completion
BAC- Budget at Completion
ACWP- Actual Cost of Work Performed
BCWP- Budgeted Cost of Work Performed
BCWS- Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled
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Interview between Mr. Wayne Abba, Program Analyst, Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) , and the
researcher, 21 August 1991.
Interview between MAJ Bruce Barrie, USAF, Course Director,
Contractor Performance Management Course, Defense Systems
Management College, and the researcher, 19 August 1991.
Interview between Ms. Michelle Bell, Cost Analyst, Air Force
Systems Command, and the researcher, 29 October 1992.
Telephonic interview with Mr. Darrell Blackburn, Manager Group
Earned Value, Motorola Inc., and the researcher, 13 February
1992.
Interview between LTC Thomas Bowman, USAF, Air Force
Aeronautical Systems Division Focal Point for C/SCSC,
Scheduling, and WBS, and the researcher, 22 August 1991.
Interview between Mr. Larry Brewer, President, Brewer and
Brewer Inc. Automated Systems, and the researcher, 29 October
1991.
Interview between MAJ David Christianson, USAF, Professor,
Cost Management, Air Force Institute of Technology, and the
researcher, 22 August 1991.
Interview between Mrs. Adeliza Cordis, Chief Systems
Engineering Branch, Defense Contract Management Area
Operation, San Francisco, and the researcher, 26 April 1991.
Telephonic interview between COL Ronald P. Daigler, USAF,
PMJEG Focal Point, and the researcher, December 1991.
Interview between Mr. R.L. Endicott, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army, RD&A, and the researcher, 4 February
1992.
Interview between Mr. Irwin J. Faibisch, Chief, Contractor
Program Management, National Security Agency, and the
researcher, 4 February 1992.
Interview between Mr. Daniel Gonzolez, Contract Specialist,
Defense Nuclear Agency, and the researcher, 31 October 1992.
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Interview between BG Otto J. Guenther, U.S. Army, Program
Executive Officer, Communications Systems, and the researcher,
2 9 January 1992.
Interview between LTC Hauck, Cost/Schedule Department
Chairman, Defense Systems Management College, and the
researcher, 19 August 1991.
Telephonic interview between COL Leland H. Hewitt, U.S. Army,
Project Manager, Army Data Distribution System, and the
researcher, 28 October 1991.
Interview between LTC John W. Hogrebe, USAF, Chief, Cost
Information and Systems Management Division, Air Force Systems
Command, and the researcher, 30 October 1991.
Telephonic interview between Mr. Bob Kemps, C/SCSC consultant,
Humphreys and Associates, and the researcher, 10 February
1992.
Interview between Ms. Shamim Khan, Surveillance Monitor,
Defense Contract Management Area Operation, San Francisco, and
the researcher, June 1991.
Telephonic interview between Mr. Ed Martin, Project Manager,
AN/ALR-62 Radar, and the researcher, 9 July 1991.
Telephonic interview between Mr. Jeri Napi, Cost Analyst, Army
Data Distribution System, and the author, October 1991.
Interview between Mr. Harold W. Nelson, Project Manager,
Ebasco Services, and the researcher, 18 August 1991.
Interview between CPT Pete Regen, USAF, Administrative
Contracting Officer, Defense Contract Management Area
Operation, and the researcher, June 1992.
Interview between LTC Bob Reuter, U.S. Army, Office of
Acquisition Policy, Program Integration, and Cost Management,
and the researcher, 31 January 1992.
Interview between Mr. Dave Robertson, Management Analyst,
Defense Contract Management Command, and the researcher, 30
October 1991.
Interview between Mr. Chuck Sell, U.S. Navy C/SCSC focal
point, and the researcher, 20 August 1991.
Interview between Mr. Larry Stone, Chief of the Contract Cost
Performance Division, Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource
Management, HQ, U.S. Army Materiel Command, and the
researcher, 20 August 1991.
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Interview between Mr. Rick Sylvester, Assistant Deputy
Director for Acquisition Policy, Office of the Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition), and the researcher, 15 August 1991.
Interview between Ms. Francis Velore, Professor, Cost
Performance Measurement Curriculum, Defense Systems Management
College, and the researcher, 20 August 1991.
Interview between RADM William Vincent, U.S. Navy, Commandant,
Defense Systems Management College, and the researcher, 5
February 1992.
Interview between MAJ Wolosz, USAF, Cost Management Division,





Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria National Workshop,
Falls Church, Virginia, 28-30 October 1991.
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